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Abstract
Self-referentiality in Constructive Semantics of




This thesis explores self-referentiality in constructive semantics of intuitionistic and
modal logics formalized via the framework of justification logic. In this framework ini-
tialed by Artemov, the language has formulas of the form t : φ, which means “the term t
is a justification of the formula φ.” Moreover, terms can occur inside formulas and hence
it is legal to have t :φ(t), which means “the term t is a justification of the formula φ about
t itself.” Formulas like this is not only interesting in the semantics of justification logic,
but also, as we will see, necessary in applications of justification logic in formalizing
constructive semantics implicitly carried by modal and intuitionistic logics.
Works initialed by Artemov and followed by Brezhnev, Fitting and others have suc-
cessfully extracted constructive meaning packaged by modality in many modal logics.
Roughly speaking, they offer methods of substituting modalities by terms in various jus-
tification logics, and then computing the exact structure of each term. After performing
these methods, each (sub)formula prefixed by a modality becomes a (sub)formula pre-
fixed by a term, which is then interpreted as the justification of the (sub)formula being
v
prefixed. In terminology of this framework, we say that modal logics are “realized” in
justification logics.
Within the family of justification logics, the Logic of Proofs LP is perhaps the most im-
portant member. As Artemov showed, this logic is not only complete w.r.t. to arithmetical
semantics about proofs, but also accommodates the modal logic S4 via realization. Com-
bined with Gödel’s modal embedding from intuitionistic propositional logic IPC to S4,
the Logic of Proofs LP serves as an intermedium via which IPC receives its provability
semantics, also known as Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics, or BHK semantics.
This thesis presents the candidate’s works in two directions. (1) Following Kuznets’
result that self-referentiality is necessary for the realization of several modal logics in-
cluding S4, we show that it is also necessary for BHK semantics. (2) We find a necessary
condition for a modal theorem to require self-referentiality in its realization, and using
this condition to derive many interesting properties about self-referentiality.
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Self-referentiality has be an interesting topic in many aspects of logic and related fields.
Its trace can be seen in (versions of) the Liar Paradox that emerged during ancient times.
Since the proposal of modern mathematical logic, there have been several milestone-like
works where self-referentiality plays a key role. In Russell’s paradox we see the presumed
set of sets that each does not belong to it self; in Gödel’s incompleteness theorem of
arithmetics we see an arithmetical sentence that is equivalent to the assertion of its own
unprovability; in Turing’s unsolvable of the halting problem we see a presumed program
that goto itself if the program coded by the input halts on the input itself; in Kleene’s
recursion theorem we see Rogers’ construction that employs a function that, when given
an input, attempts to compute the value of the function indexed by the input when the
input itself is fed, and if succeeds, returns the index of a function that behaves the same
as the function indexed by that value. Though more instances can be listed, those just
mentioned are enough to indicate how important self-referentiality can be. Books like
[59] and [67] have general surveys and detailed analysis of many instances.
In this thesis, we will explore self-referentiality in constructive semantics of intu-
itionistic and modal logics, formulated via the framework of justification logic. Self-
referentiality is involved since a language of justification logic has the ability of saying
1
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something like “a justification justifies an assertion about the justification itself.” As we
will present in later chapters, this ability is not only interesting by its own, but also nec-
essary in applications of justification logic in formalizing constructive contents implicitly
carried by modal and intuitionistic logics.
Here is an outline of this thesis. The current Chapter 1 is an introduction in which we
present backgrounds like the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics and the frame-
work of justification logic. Chapter 2 discusses self-referentiality in modal logics in terms
of their constructive reading via justification logics. Some results presented in that chap-
ter is gained in earlier works by Roman Kuznets. Chapter 3 takes a closer look at modal
logics that are self-referential, and explores properties of their “non-self-referential frag-
ments.” Chapter 4 tracks one step further to the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov seman-
tics of intuitionistic propositional logic via the Gödel–Artemov approach, the necessity of
self-referentiality there, and properties of non-self-referential fragments. Chapter 5 is a
concluding chapter where several directions for future works are suggested.
The current chapter is started by Section 1.1 presenting justification logic in general
with formal definitions.
Followed is Section 1.2 carrying a brief historic introduction about the Brouwer–
Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics, the formalization of which has served as the initial mo-
tivation of the first justification logic, Artemov’s Logic of Proofs.
In Section 1.3, we formally present the phenomena of self-referentiality in the lan-
guage of justification logic with their intuitive meanings in various kinds of semantics.
Before start, we present here some pre-settings effective in the whole thesis. Settings
typically for specified chapters or sections will not be given until necessary. In this thesis,
we denote formulas or subformulas by α, β, ..., φ, ψ, ..., and sets of formulas by Γ, Θ, ...,
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with optional superscripts or subscripts. By a prime formula, we mean either a proposi-
tional atom like p, q, etc., or a falsehood ⊥. In a propositional language, falsehood ⊥ and
implication→ are always primitive connectives unless otherwise mentioned, and > is de-
fined as an abbreviation of ⊥→⊥. In intuitionistic setting, conjunction ∧ and disjunction
∨ are also primitive. Negation ¬φ is defined as the abbreviation of φ→⊥. In classical
setting, α ∨ β is defined as the abbreviation of ¬α→ β, and α ∧ β as the abbreviation




can be applied to sets of formulas, while
∧
∅ := > and
∨
∅ := ⊥ by
definition. In a modal language,  is the only primitive modality, and ^φ is defined as the
abbreviation of ¬¬φ. For binding force, ¬ and  are the strongest, followed by ∧ and ∨,
and then→. We usually present all parentheses except for the outer-most, and in case that
we do not, right associativity is assumed for connectives. In general, ` means syntactical
derivability, and means semantical satisfiability (semantical consequence is hardly used,
if ever). By ε0Bε1, we mean that syntactical expression ε0 occurs in ε1 as a sub-expression.
Accordingly, 0, 1, and 7 respectively mean “not derivable,” “not satisfied,” and “does not
occur as a sub-expression of.” Polarities of subformulas (and their main connectives) are
defined as usual. For example, φ ∧ ψ is a positive subformula of χ implies that φ is also
a positive subformula of χ. For another example, φ→ ψ is a negative subformula of χ
implies that φ is a positive subformula of χ, and ψ is a negative subformula of χ. For
classical propositional logic CPC, we do not specify a typical formulation of axioms.
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1.1 The Framework of Justification Logic
The first justification logic is Artemov’s Logic of Proofs LP [1, 2], which serves as an
intermedium via which modal logic S4 receives its provability semantics in Gödel sense,
and so does the intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. What just mentioned is called the
Gödel–Artemov approach of formalizing the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov Semantics.
An introduction for this approach can be given easier using notions defined in this section,
as we will do in Section 1.2.
The key idea of LP is to employ inductively defined (justification) terms to play the
role of modality  in S4. By substituting modalities in an S4-theorem intelligently, we
get an LP-theorem, and hence “constructively explains” the meaning of modalities in the
given S4-theorem by structures of terms interpretable in semantics of LP. Employing
various classes of terms, this idea has been generalized by Brezhnev and many others to
modal logics other than S4, like K, D4, S4.2, S5, and many others. All other LP-like
logics considered in this thesis correspond to modal logics with only k, d, t, 4 as axiom
schemes, and are all included in [13]. All of them, together with those correspond to
modal logics with b and 5 as axiom schemes can be found in [32]. There are also LP-like
logics correspond to less-familiar modal logics [26]. Now the whole group of LP-like
logics are called justification logics. Among them, five logics interesting in the current
thesis are included in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Justification Logics J, JD, JT, J4, LP [2, 13, 46]) Let (justification) terms
be defined by {
in J, JD, and JT t ::= c | x | t · t | t+t
in J4 and LP t ::= c | x | t · t | t+t | !t
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Table 1.1: Axiom Schemes of Justification Logic
Name Form (scheme) Adopted in Logic
A0.1 φ→ (ψ→φ) All
A0.2 (φ→ (ψ→χ))→ ((φ→ψ)→ (φ→χ)) All
A0.3 ((ψ→⊥)→ (φ→⊥))→ (φ→ψ) All
A1.1 t :φ→φ JT, LP
A1.2 t :⊥→⊥ JD
A2 t1 : (φ→ψ)→ (t2 :φ→ t1 ·t2 :ψ) All
A3 t :φ→!t : t :φ J4, LP
A4.1 t1 :φ→ t1+t2 :φ All
A4.2 t2 :φ→ t1+t2 :φ All
where ·,+, ! are called operators, and (justification) formulas be defined by
φ ::= ⊥ | p | φ→φ | t :φ,
where c is a constant, x is a variable, and p is a (propositional) atom. Constants and
variables are called atomic terms. We sometimes generally say justification language,
without specifying the logic that uses it.
Axiom schemes of justification logics are summarized in Table 1.1:




is shared by all logics. J4 and LP have AN.1 with form
(AN.1)
c : A
where A is an axiom and c is a constant. J, JD, and JT have AN.2 with form
(AN.2)
cn : · · · : c1 : A
where A is an axiom, and c1 · · · cn is an initial segment of a series of constants. Rules
AN.1 and AN.2 are called axiom necessitation, and the notation AN in used in the general
sense. a
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For Binding force of the three operators, “!” is in the strongest rank, “·” in the second, and
“+” in the weakest. Left associativity is assumed for both “·” and “+,” though we usually
present enough parentheses to ease reading. For binding force of connectives, besides
those mentioned in Chapter 1, “t :” shares the same rank with , so for instance, t :φ→ψ
should be understood as (t :φ)→ψ.
Consider the definition of (justification) terms, roughly speaking, variables stand for
justifications of hypothesis, constants stand for that of axioms (in this logic), operation
“·” outputs the justification of the conclusion once that of the two premises of a Modus
Ponens are input, operation “!” raises a term to another that justifies the given fact that
a formula is justified by the given term, and operation “+” provides a joined justification
that justifies anything justified by either of the two given terms. Given a justification
proof, it is then possible to see how a conclusion gets justified, by analyzing the prefixed
term and reducing it to variables and constants that justify hypothesis and axioms. Axiom
necessitation is the rule that allows us to introduce axioms “justified” by constants, hence
by taking care of applications of this rule, we can see the role of constants and axioms
in a proof. This leads to the notion of constant specification, formally presented after the
following notational convention.1
Convention 2 Adopting the notation from [13] for J, JD, and JT, we denote cn by ! · · ·!︸︷︷︸
n−1
c,
or in abbreviation, !n−1c. Note that “!” dose not appear in the definition of the language of
these three logics in Definition 1, and is totally notational. From now on we take
(AN.2)
!nc :!n−1c : · · · :c : A
1The definition of language of justification logic as presented in Definition 1 generally follows Kuznets’
[46]. In Brezhnev’s [13] where J, JD, and JT originally introduced, the notation for constant is different,
and somehow misleading, since “!” is an operator in some logics while being purely notational in other
logics. However, Brezhnev’s notation is much more convenient when talking about self-referentiality, and
hence we prefer to adopt it from now on.
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as the form of AN.2. Introduction of “!” in these three logics does not indicate any opera-
tional meaning enjoyed by the same symbol in the other two logics. With this convention,
the first element of a constant series becomes a sub-expression of any constant in that
series.
Definition 3 (Constant Specification) A constant specification (notation CS):
in J4 and LP, is a set of formulas of the form c : A (where c is a constant and A is an
axiom);
in J, JD, and JT, the form is !nc :!n−1c : · · · :c : A, and downward closure is required (for
any natural number z, if !zc :!z−1c : · · · :c : A ∈ CS then !z−1c : · · · :c : A ∈ CS).
A constant specification CS is injective if for each constant c, there is at most one
axiom A s.t. c : A ∈ CS.
For any constant specification CS, if the AN rule of, say LP, is restricted to introduce
only formulas in CS, then the resulting system is denoted by LP(CS). For instance, LP(∅)
is the system obtained by dropping AN.1 from LP. We have similar notions and notations
for the other justification logics in Definition 1.
Clearly, the collection of all AN rule-applications in a justification proof automati-
cally forms a constant specification. We say the justification proof calls for that constant
specification. a
Justification logics enjoy the deduction theorem relativized to any constant specifica-
tion, which can be proved by the standard method.
Lemma 4 (Deduction Theorem) Let X ranges from {J, JD, JT, J4, LP}. Then for any for-
mulas φ, ψ, and any set of formulas Γ, in X(CS), if Γ, φ ` ψ, then Γ ` φ→ ψ.
Justification logics can be seen as the “explicit counterparts” of modal logics. If we
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replace each modality in a modal formula by a (justification) term, reading as the reason
why the formula being prefixed holds, then we have a chance to explicitly explain structure
of information implicitly carried by modalities.
Though there are several textbooks for modal logic (like [18, 11]), to make the thesis
self-contained, we present some preliminaries about modal logics before going further.
(Propositional) modal language is defined as the language got by adding the following
closure rule to the definition of (classical) propositional language:
If φ is a formula, then so is φ,
where the modality  is understood as “it is true in all accessible world that,” “it is known
that,” “it is believed that,” etc., depending on the environment in which this language
is used [11]. In the framework of justification logic, we consider modal language as a
language of (realizable) provability, and hence may understand it roughly as “we have an
explicitly constructed justification of.”
Definition 5 (Modal Logics K,D,T,K4,S4 [11]) In the modal language, K has, in addi-







and is complete w.r.t. the class of all Kripke frames.
D has, in addition to those in K, the axiom scheme
⊥→⊥,
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and is complete w.r.t. the class of serial Kripke frames (that is, each state has at least one
accessible state).
T has, in addition to those in K, the axiom scheme
φ→φ,
and is complete w.r.t. the class of reflexive Kripke frames.
K4 has, in addition to those in K, the axiom scheme
φ→φ,
and is complete w.r.t. the class of transitive Kripke frames.
S4 has, in addition to those in T, the axiom scheme
φ→φ,
and is complete w.r.t. the class of reflexive and transitive Kripke frames. a
Definition 6 (Normal Modal Logics [11]) A collection of formulas in the modal lan-
guage is a normal modal logic if it:
(i) contains all tautologies,
(ii) contains all instances of the scheme (φ→ψ)→ (φ→ψ),
(iii) is closed under (Nec), and
(iv) is closed under (MP). a
It follows easily from the definition that the set of theorems of each of K, D, T, K4, and
S4 is a normal modal logic.
We continue by presenting the notion of realization.
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Definition 7 (Realization [2]) A realizer, denoted by r, is a mapping from the set of all
modal formulas to the set of all formulas in a justification language s.t. given any modal
formula φ, it replaces all -occurrences in φ by (justification) terms.
The resulting justification formula, denoted by φr, is called a potential realization of
φ. A potential realization φr of φ is a realization (of φ), if it is a theorem in the justification
logic.
A realizer is normal, if if assigns distinct variables to negative -occurrences. A
realization φr of φ is normal, if the realizer r is normal, and there is a proof of φr in the
justification logic that calls for a injective constant specification. a
Theorem 8 (Realization Theorem [2, 13]) For any modal formula φ, let X range from
{K,D,T,K4,S4}, and Y range from {J, JD, JT, J4, LP}, resp., then what follows are equiv-
alent:
(i) X ` φ;
(ii) Y ` φr for some normal realization φr.
Theorem 8 was first proved by Artemov for LP in [1] by giving a mechanical procedure
that, when given an S4-theorem φ, computes a normal realizer r together with a proof of
φr in LP showing the normality of the realization. A detailed instruction is available in
[14].
The direction from (ii) to (i) is relatively trivial. Define forgetful projection as the
mapping from the justification language to the modal language that replaces each term
that is not a proper subterm-occurrence of another by a . Observe that the forgetful
projection of each axiom of LP is an axiom of S4. (MP) is simply preserved, and (AN)
corresponds to (Nec) applied on an axiom.
The other direction from (i) to (ii) is interesting. Generally speaking, each negative
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 or non-principal positive  is replaced by a variable in the language of LP, and each
principal positive  is replaced by the sum (terms connected by the “+” operator) of a
finite list of “provisional variables.” Based on a cut-free sequent calculus of S4, each
provisional variable corresponds to an (R) rule in the sequent proof tree, and by using
Internalization Lemma (Lemma 40 in Section 2.2, also known as Lifting Lemma) on those
rules while induction on the structure of the sequent proof tree, one gets actual LP-terms
to replace provisional variables while constructing an LP-proof.
Artemov’s procedure was then generalized by Brezhnev [13] to apply on several other
modal logic - justification logic pairs including all concerned in the current thesis. In
Section 2.2, we will present in very detail a refined proof that has additional properties
when applied to theorems in the later defined “loop-free provable” fragment of modal
logics.
Other proofs of this theorem include Fitting’s methods in [23], [24], and [25], Brunnler
et. al.’s algorithmatic method based on nested sequent calculus in [16] (also cf. Goetschi
and Kuznets’ [32]), Wang’s method in [65], and others.
In this thesis, if Theorem 8 holds between modal logic X and justification logic Y,
then we say that X is the modal logic corresponding to Y, and Y is the justification logic
corresponding to X.
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1.2 The Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov Semantics of In-
tuitionistic Logics
The first justification logic, Artemov’s Logic of Proofs LP, was motivated by the desire of
offering a provability semantics to intuitionistic logic (also known as Brouwer–Heyting–
Kolmogorov semantics, or BHK semantics) following Gödel’s modal embedding. This
leads to the Gödel–Artemov approach of formalizing BHK, the only known successful
formulation so far.
In this section, we briefly introduce the history of BHK while giving definitions when
appropriate.
Intuitionistic logic is the logical basis of the school in philosophy of mathematics
called intuitionism. The intuitionism in mathematics dates back into the 19th century,
when it was an informal idea from works in mathematics or even science [60]. Brouwer
was the first one to gave principles of intuitionism. According to Brouwer, only con-
structions achieve mathematical objects, and only proofs achieve mathematical truth [15],
which is pretty natural given the thoughts of intuitionists that mathematics are purely con-
structive mental activities of humans. Brouwer’s principles were then crystallized inde-
pendently by Heyting and Kolmogorov, in different terminologies though, and the result-
ing stipulations are nowadays known after their names as Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov
(BHK) Semantics.
Since truth of a formula is interpreted as a proof of it, in order to say the truth of a
composite formula in terms of truths of its components, we need to explain a proof of the
composite formula in terms of proofs of its components. For the propositional language,
the BHK semantics gives stipulations like follows:2
2Recall that ¬φ is defined as an abbreviation of φ→⊥.
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• nothing can be a proof of ⊥;
• a proof of φ ∧ ψ is the pair of a proof of φ and a proof of ψ;
• a proof of φ ∨ ψ is a proof of φ or a proof of ψ;
• a proof of φ→ψ is a construction that returns a proof of ψ whenever a proof of φ is
given.
These stipulations are still informal, with notions like “construction” and “proof” un-
explained. Efforts has been devoted to clarify those notations, and give the BHK semantics
a formalization.
In the 1930s, Gödel proposed in [30] the modal embedding that faithfully maps intu-
itionistic propositional logic into an axiomatization of provability (where Bp means “p is
provable”) that is essentially modal logic S4. Then in [31], which remains unpublished
until 1995 in the collection [20], Gödel proposed a way of using a decidable proof relation
“zBp, q,” which means “z is a derivation of q from p,” instead of “Bp” from [30], together
with functions over derivations to give a constructive explanation. However, without the
provability semantics of S4, and even without a general understanding of modal logic,
this thread seemed to go nowhere.
In the 1940s, Kleene [39] proposed his realizability theory, which attempts to achieve
intuitionistic truth via computable functions. In Kleene’s approach, the predicate
natural number n realizes intuituionistic arithmetical formula φ
is not decidable, making it essentially different from the decidable proof predicate
natural number n is the code of a proof of the formula φ,
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and hence this approach does not address BHK semantics properly. This approach was
accepted for long as a good attempt to formalize BHK semantics, and stipulations of
BHK has been introduced by authors in an altered form to accommodate the connection.
Since Kleene’s realization predicate is not decidable in general, given a realizer of a dis-
junction, one cannot always mechanically determine which disjunct is realized. In order
to compromise, an extra identifier is added to explicitly point out the realized disjunct.
This identifier has also been seen in the stipulation of disjunction when introducing BHK
semantics by authors (like in [60]).
In the 1960s, Kreisel [43] proposed an approach to formalize BHK vis a theory of
construction. The theory was later shown to be inconsistent by Goodman [33] who estab-
lished a “self-referential paradox,” and attempts of fixing the problem do not preserve the
relationship with BHK semantics. Despite of this, Kreisel should be credited as the first
one who attempts to formalize φ→ψ not only as a construction that returns a proof of ψ
when a proof of φ is given, but also a proof that the construction does work in addition to
that.
Finally in 1995, Artemov [1] successfully finished the previously mentioned approach
initialed by Gödel [30]. This was achieved by offering the Logic of Proofs LP (one of the
justification logics in Definition 1) that serves as an intermedium via which S4 reaches its
provability semantics. The idea of using the decidable proof predicate t :φ (meaning “t is
a proof of φ”) can be seen as echoing Gödel’s zBp, q in [31], although Artemov’s [1] was
finished without knowing Gödel’s [31] that appeared in the same year. This approach is
now known as Gödel–Artemov approach, which will be introduced in more detail in the
rest of this section.
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The Gödel–Artemov approach can generally be displayed as:
IPC ↪→ S4 ↪→ LP ↪→ PA. (1.1)
In this approach, a formula is a theorem of intuitionistic propositional logic IPC iff its
embedding image is a theorem of S4, iff its embedding image has some realization that is
a theorem of LP under some constant specification, iff this LP-theorem is interpreted as
a Peano Arithmetic PA-theorem under any interpretation that admits this constant speci-
fication. Note that “realization” here (cf. Definition 7) has a meaning different from that
it has in Kleene’s realizability theory. Followed this approach, we can read each modality
 in S4 as “there is an explicit proof of.” This reading is different from the reading of 
as “there is a proof of” in Gödel-Löb provability logic GL. In GL, φ is understood as
a Σ1-sentence that there exists an x that is a proof of (the interpretation of) φ. In Gödel–
Artemov approach, as we will see later, φ will be interpreted as a decidable assertion
where  is assigned a term t that explicitly displays the structure of the proof of (the in-
terpretation of) φ. This approach can be explored further by considering the first-order
case, though provability semantics in first-order case are not recursively axiomatizable, as
shown by Artemov and Yavorskaya (Sidon) in [8].
The first step in (1.1) is from IPC to S4.
The intuitionistic propositional logic IPC was gradually developed by Kolmogorov
[41], Glivenko [29], Heyting (who is mostly acknowledged) [35], and others. Though
each of them attempted to provide a formal proof system that adopts Brouwer’s thoughts,
non-equivalent axiomatizations were proposed because of differences in understanding
Brouwer. Now decades later, by IPC, people usually mean a modern agreed axiomatiza-
tion. In the current thesis, we adopt the following:
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Definition 9 (Intuitionistic Propositional Logic IPC [63]) The language is defined by
φ ::= ⊥ | p | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ→φ.
MP is the only inference rule, and axiom schemes are listed as follows, sorted in groups:
⊥→φ
φ→ (ψ→φ) (φ→ (ψ→χ))→ ((φ→ψ)→ (φ→χ))
φ ∧ ψ→φ φ ∧ ψ→ψ φ→ (ψ→φ ∧ ψ)
φ→φ ∨ ψ ψ→φ ∨ ψ (φ→χ)→ ((ψ→χ)→ (φ ∨ ψ→χ)).
a
Extending IPC by allowing first-order quantifiers gives the intuitionistic first-order predi-
cate logic IQC [40]. Adding appropriate clauses for quantifies into the BHK semantics of
IPC gives that of IQC (cf. [9]).
Proposed by Gödel [30] and verified by McKinsey and Tarski [49], one can faithfully
embed IPC into S4, by prefixing each subformula with a , or more formally, by the
embedding (·)4 defined as:
p4 := p;
⊥4 := ⊥;
(φ  ψ)4 := (φ4  ψ4) for  ∈ {∧,∨,→}.
Theorem 10 (A Faithful Embedding of IPC into S4 [49]) Let φ be a propositional for-
mula. Then IPC ` φ iff S4 ` φ4.
This theorem was first proof by McKinsey and Tarski with algebraic method in [49].
Alternatively one can prove this via cut-free sequent calculus, as in [63].
This constitutes the first step from IPC to S4 in (1.1), i.e., with the help of Theorem
10, the provability semantics of S4 offers a natural provability semantics of IPC [2]. Note
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that there are many “similar” embeddings of IPC into S4 [63], and some of them will be
considered in Section 4.1. We preserve (·)4 for the “ each subformula” embedding, and
use (·)× for a general embedding. Other specific interesting embeddings will also be given
notations in Section 4.1. Each of this embeddings actually gives a provability semantics
of IPC, but only (·)4 inductively meets the thought of “truth as provability.”
The second step in (1.1) from S4 to LP has been presented in Section 1.1 (cf. Defini-
tion 7 and Theorem 8).
Combining Theorem 10 and Theorem 8, we have:
Corollary 11 For any propositional formula φ: IPC ` φ iff LP ` φ4r for some normal
realization φ4r.
Similar results hold, if we take other faithful embeddings from IPC to S4 instead of (·)4.
The last step in (1.1) is from LP to formal proofs in PA.
Playing a rule here is the provability semantics of LP [2]. Let Pr f (·, ·) be a ∆1-formula
s.t.:
• for each arithmetic sentence φ, PA ` φ iff Pr f (n, pφq) for some natural number n;
• for each natural number k, the set T (k) = {l | Pr f (k, l)} is finite and its code is
computable;
• for any natural numbers k, l, there is a natural number n s.t. T (k) ∪ T (l) ⊆ T (n).
Then there are computable functions m(·, ·), a(·, ·), and c(·), s.t. for any arithmetical for-
mulas φ, ψ, any natural numbers k, n, all of
• Pr f (k, pφ→ψq) ∧ Pr f (n, pφq)→Pr f (m(k, n), pψq),
• (Pr f (k, pφq)→Pr f (a(k, n), pφq)) ∧ (Pr f (n, pφq)→Pr f (a(k, n), pφq)), and
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• Pr f (k, pφq)→Pr f (c(k), pPr f (k, pφq)q)
are valid. An arithmetical interpretation (with the choice of Pr f and its appropriate func-
tions m, a, c as parameters) assigns each propositional atomic formula an arithmetic sen-
tence, assigns each atomic term a natural number, commutes with Boolean operations,
and satisfies:
(t · s)∗ = m(t∗, s∗), (t + s)∗ = a(t∗, s∗), (!t)∗ = c(t∗),
and
(t :φ)∗ = Pr f (t∗, pφ∗q) .
For each constant specification CS, an interpretation ∗ is a CS-interpretation, if under ∗,
all formulas in CS are PA-theorems. An LP-formula φ is provably valid under constant
specification CS, if PA ` φ∗ for any CS-interpretation ∗.
Theorem 12 (Arithmetical Completeness of LP [2]) For any LP-formula φ:
(A) LP(CS) ` φ iff φ is provably valid under CS;
(B) LP ` φ iff φ is provably valid under some constant specification.
This constitutes the last step in (1.1), and with the help of Theorem 8 and Theorem 10,
we have the following two theorems.
Theorem 13 (Arithmetical Completeness of S4 [2]) For any modal formula φ: S4 ` φ
iff φr is provably valid under some constant specification, for some normal realization φr.
Theorem 14 (Arithmetical Completeness of IPC [2]) For any faithful embedding (·)×
and any propositional formula φ: IPC ` φ iff φ×r is provably valid under some constant
specification, for some normal realization φ×r.
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This finishes our description of the Gödel–Artemov approach of formalizing BHK
semantics shown in (1.1).
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1.3 Self-referentiality in Justification Logics
In the arithmetical semantics of LP, a proof predicate Pr f (·, ·) that satisfies certain require-
ments is employed as a parameter [2]. As we listed in Section 1.2, those requirements only
includes: being a ∆1-formula, each proof proves a finite computable set of theorems, and
the conjoinability of proofs. All those requirements are natural, but not all natural prop-
erties are required, which leaves spaces to explore. For instance, Artemov considered the
symmetry of choice of proofs and introduced Symmetric Logic of Proofs in [3]. For an
even earlier instance, Artemov and Straβen tried to capture the Gödel proof predicate in
[7].
Recall the language of justification logics (cf. Definition 1). The language admits
formulas of the form t :φ, where φ is a (sub)formula by itself and may contain occurrences
of terms. Even the very term t may occur in φ, and hence we have a legal formula of the
form t :φ(t). Formulas like this is said to be self-referential.
The same may happen when t is a constant and φ is an axiom. Thus we have the
following definition in all the five logics in Definition 1, where our notational Conversion
2 for “!” in J, JD, and JT applies.
Definition 15 (Self-referentiality of Constant Specification [45, 46]) A constant speci-
fication CS is
(i) self-referential, if it has a subset of the form
{ c1 : A1(c2), · · · , cn−1 : An−1(cn), cn : An(c1) }.
(ii) directly self-referential, if it has a formula of the form c : A(c). a
Given a self-referential formula t :φ(t), i.e., the formula φ which contains t is prefixed
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by (another occurrence of) t. According to the arithmetical semantics of LP,
(t :φ(t))∗ = Pr f (t∗, pφ(t)∗q) ,
that is, t∗ is a code of a proof of (φ(t))∗. An observation indicates that this may not
be consistent with the Gödel proof predicate. Actually, a natural coding of arithmetical
formulas is defined inductively on parse tree of formulas. One plugs codes of subformulas
into fixed computable functions associated to, e.g., connectives, and assigns the computed
output to a formula as its code. Usually, this will lead to a property that the code of a
formula is always larger than that of its proper subformulas. In our example, this often
indicates
t∗ < pφ(t)∗q. (1.2)
On the other hand, the code of a proof is usually defined as the code of a list of formulas
or that of a tree of formulas, depending on how the notion of “proof” is defined. This is to
say, we have x ≮ y if Pr f (x, y), which means, if Pr f (t∗, pφ(t)∗q) holds, then so is
t∗ ≮ pφ(t)∗q ,
which contradicts (1.2). Therefore, an arithmetical interpretation with a natural proof
predicate is likely to falsify self-referential formulas.
The arithmetical semantics of LP, as we mentioned in Section 1.2, captures a wide
class of arithmetical interpretations by employing a proof predicate and three computable
functions that satisfy the stipulations as parameters. This class contains combinations that
are mostly intended (like what we just considered as “natural”), but also contains many
others.
Artemov mentioned in [2] that the procedure given there to prove the realization theo-
rem of S4 (in LP) may lead to (directly) self-referential constant specifications, and asked
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whether this is necessary. This is important, since according to the arithmetical complete-
ness (Theorem 12), if a modal formula is realized into LP with a constant specification
CS, then the realized formula becomes a PA-theorem under any interpretation that admits
CS. If a self-referential formula falsified by any natural interpretation is involved in CS,
then the realized formula is a PA-theorem only under unnatural interpretations.
Self-referential formulas are syntactical objects, and hence express self-referential
meanings in all various kinds of semantics. The arithmetical semantics we just men-
tioned is for LP only, and there are other semantics that work for some or all logics in
Definition 1. Within them, Mkrtychev semantics [50] is the first that has built in syntacti-
cal component, called evidence function; Fitting semantics [23] is a multi-state version of
Mkrtychev semantics, and works for all logics in Definition 1. Formal definitions of these
semantics are given in Section 2.1. Artemov’s modular semantics, though mathematically
similar to Fitting semantics, suggests a better understanding of the ontology of justifica-
tion in a logic setting [5]. In Mkrtychev or Fitting semantics, the self-referential formula
t :φ(t) means t justifies the assertion φ about t itself (on a state, if in the Fitting semantics).
In modular semantics that interprets a (justification) term on a state as the set of formulas
justified by it on that state, t :φ(t) means t is a set containing the formula φ(t) (on a state).
Encountering t :φ(t), there is then no way to reduce the term t to an expression free of t.
Chapter 2
Self-referentiality in Modal Logics
This chapter is about self-referentiality in modal logics in terms of their realization in
justification logics.
It starts by Section 2.1 presenting Kuznets’ works [14, 45, 46] on self-referentiality.
Generally speaking, Kuznets’ works show that: (1) each of T, K4, and S4 has theo-
rems whose realizations in JT, J4, and LP respectively necessarily call for directly self-
referential constant specifications, and (2) K and D are both free of such theorems.
Then Section 2.2 carries the candidate’s earlier (as a master student in Tsinghua Uni-
versity) work on refining Kuznets’ result in modal logic S4, presented uniformly with its
later (since the candidate became a student in the Graduate Center, City University of New
York) extension to both T and K4. A decidable necessary condition for self-referentiality
in realization is formulated in that section, and a refinement of Artemov’s realization pro-
cedure (in order to prove Theorem 8 for LP in Artemov’s [2]) is presented in detail.
23
CHAPTER 2. SELF-REFERENTIALITY IN MODAL LOGICS 24
2.1 Kuznets’ Works on the Logic Level
In Section 1.3, we discussed the meaning of self-referential formulas, e.g., t : φ(t), in se-
mantics of LP, and Artemov’s question that whether such formulas are necessary in the
realization of S4 in LP. One might think that the appearance of self-referential formulas is
due to the realization procedure used in [2], which in principle does not cover all possibli-
ties of realizing a specified formula, and other realization method like those in [24], [16],
and [65], may help. This is not true, as Kuznets showed in [14] that self-referentiality is
intrinsic in the realization of S4 in LP.
Theorem 16 (Direct Self-referentiality of S4 [14]) Any realization of the S4-theorem
¬¬(p→ p) (2.1)
calls for a directly self-referential constant specification.
Remark: The transitivity axiom φ→ φ in S4 can be read in an epistemic per-
spective as “if the agent knows φ, then he also knows the fact that he knows φ.” In this
way, together with the reading of (φ→ψ)→ (φ→ψ) as “the agent’s knowledge of the
succedent follows from that of the antecedent and that of the implication,” and the reading
of φ→ φ as “only true facts can be known by the agent,” S4 becomes a (single agent)
epistemic logic of knowledge with positive introspection. Taking an equivalent (under
S4) form of (2.1),
¬(p ∧ ¬p),
one can read this principle as “M is not known,” where M stands for the Moore sentence
p ∧ ¬p, meaning “p is true but not known.” Hence the fact that (2.1) is an S4-theorem
tells us that if positive introspection of knowledge is assumed, then Moore sentence is not
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knowable. The above observation has given an indication that self-referentiality may be
related to interesting epistemic principles. However, this trend is diluted, as more self-
referential examples (in Section 4.2) are found later.
Back to Kuznets’ theorem, we offer an example here, displaying a realization of (2.1)
via the realization procedure in [2] with a directly self-referential constant specification.
Since the procedure involves many heavy computations, like converting a sequent proof
to a Hilbert-style axiomatic proof, a step-by-step presentation is not only hard to read, but
also fails to give a good intuition. Yet the realization is quite sensitive to the computation,
and hence a sketch will look like a list of expressions with no obvious relationship between
them. Therefore, we only display the final result, and omit all computations.
Example 17 The S4-theorem ¬¬(p→ p) has two ’s, one negative and one positive.
The LP-theorem ¬x :¬(p → c2 ·(c1·!x) : p) is a realization of it. An example proof of this
LP-theorem calls for the constant specification{
c1 : [x :¬(p→c2 ·(c1·!x) : p)→¬(p→c2 ·(c1·!x) : p)],
c2 : [¬(p→c2 ·(c1·!x) : p)→ p]
}
that is directly self-referential.1
Note that the realization procedure is sensitive to propositional axioms of LP, to the way
we treat negative ’s, to proof-search algorithm for S4, to algorithm used to convert
a sequent proof into a Hilbert-style proof, etc., and hence the reader is likely to get a
different result after computing by himself. A beauty of Theorem 16 is, its method is
not sensitive to these choices, and even not sensitive to the general method of realizing
S4-theorems. Theorem 16 turns down all possibilities of realizing (2.1) while avoiding
direct self-referentiality.
1Note that both c1 and c2 occur in the axiom prefixed by the other, and hence we also have a reference
cycle of length 2.
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The proof of Theorem 16 employs a construction of a counter Mkrtychev model that
admits the largest constant specification that is not directly self-referential, of any potential
realization of (2.1). This method was generalized in Kuznets’ later works [45, 46], where
Fitting semantics is employed instead of Mkrtychev semantics, to get similar results for
both T and K4. Also proved in [45, 46] is the fact that both K and D do not enjoy such
results.
It is helpful here to have the following definitions.
Definition 18 (Self-referentiality of Modal Theorems) A theorem of a modal logic is
self-referential (directly self-referential), if each of its realizations in the corresponding
justification logic necessarily calls for a constant specification that is self-referential (di-
rectly self-referential). a
Definition 19 (Self-referentiality of Modal Logics) If a modal logic has a theorem that
is self-referential (directly self-referential), then the logic itself is said to be self-referential
(directly self-referential). a
With the above definitions, we can summarize Kuznets’ results in [45, 46] as
Theorem 20 ([45, 46]) (A) Both T and K4 are directly self-referential.
(B) Both K and D are not self-referential.
Self-referential theorems found by Kuznets for T, K4 are presented in Table 2.1 that sum-
marizes Kuznets’ results in [14, 45, 46].
For non-self-referential facts, Kuznets [45, 46] offers a refinement of Artemov’s re-
alization procedure, and hence gives an instruction following which all K-theorem (D-
theorem) can be realized in J (JD, resp.) non-self-referentially. For self-referential facts,
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Table 2.1: A Summary of Kuznets’ Results.
Modal mate Self-referentiality Instance
J K No N.A.
JD D No N.A.
JT T Directly ¬¬(p→ p)
J4 K4 Directly ¬(p→ p)→⊥
S4 K4 Directly ¬¬(p→ p)
as we mentioned above, Fitting semantics is employed. As this semantics will be em-
ployed by our later sections, we present it here formally. Compared to other works like
[23] and [46], our notations as presented below are slightly different. Employing such
notations makes it easier to present our proofs in Section 3.3 and Section 4.2.
Definition 21 (Evidence Function [50]) A unary function ∗(·) from the set of terms to
the power set of formulas is called an evidence function if it satisfies the following closure
conditions: 
ψ ∈ ∗(t) implies (t :ψ) ∈ ∗(!t) for J4 and LP only
τ→φ ∈ ∗(t1) and τ ∈ ∗(t2) implies φ ∈ ∗(t1 · t2)
∗(t1) ∪ ∗(t2) ⊆ ∗(t1+t2).
An evidence function ∗ is full, if φ ∈ ∗(t) holds for any term t and formula φ.
For a set X of formulas of the form t : φ and an evidence function ∗, if φ ∈ ∗(t) holds
for any t :φ ∈ X, then we say that ∗ admits X, also, that ∗ is an X-evidence function. This
terminology is frequently used when X is a constant specification.
Given a set X of formulas of the form t : φ, by ∗X, we mean the closure of X under
these conditions, which is automatically an X-evidence function. X is called the initial set
of ∗X. If φ ∈ ∗(t) is the case since t :φ ∈ X, then φ ∈ ∗(t) is said to be achieved via initial
set. If φ ∈ ∗(t) is the case but t :φ < X, then φ ∈ ∗(t) is said to be achieved via closure. a
Lemma 22 ([50]) ∗X is the smallest X-evidence function. That is, if ∗′ is an X-evidence
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function, then for any term s and formula φ, we have φ ∈ ∗X(s) implies φ ∈ ∗′(s).
Definition 23 (Fitting Model [23]) A Fitting model is a tuple M = (W,R, E,V), where
(W,R,V) is a Kripke model in the standard setting i.e., W is a non-empty set of states, R is
a binary accessible relation on W, and V is a propositional valuation. R must be serial in
case of JD, be reflexive in cases of JT and LP, and be transitive in cases of J4 and LP. E
is an evidence function assignment that assigns to each state w ∈ W an evidence function
(usually denoted by ∗w). In cases of J4 and LP, the property of monotonicity is further
required. That is, if uRv, then ∗u(t) ⊆ ∗v(t) for any term t.
An evidence function assignment E is a CS-evidence function assignment, if it assigns
to each state a CS-evidence function.
If E is a CS-evidence function assignment, then M = (W,R, E,V) is called a CS-
model.
ForM = (W,R, E,V), byM,w  φ, we meanM satisfies φ on w. This is defined by:
(i)M,w 2 ⊥,
(ii)M,w  p iff w ∈ V(p),
(iii)M,w  φ→ψ iffM,w 2 φ orM,w  ψ,
(iv)M,w  t :φ, iffM, v  φ for each v s.t. wRv, and φ ∈ E(w, t). a
Theorem 24 (Fitting Completeness [23]) Let X range from {J, JD, JT, J4, LP}, then for
any justification formula φ:
X(CS) ` φ iffM,w  φ for any CS-modelM and state w.
For LP, we have the completeness w.r.t. Mkrtychev semantics [50], which is discov-
ered earlier and mathematically simpler than Fitting semantics. With Definition 23 of
Fitting models, we can formulate Mkrtychev semantics as follows.
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Definition 25 (Mkrtychev Model [50]) A Mkrtychev model for LP is a Fitting model
for LP with only one reflexive state.
More formally, a Mkrtychev model is a pairM = (∗,V) where ∗ is an evidence func-
tion (as in Definition 21), and V is a propositional valuation.
If ∗ is a CS-evidence function, thenM = (∗,V) is called a CS-model.
ByM  φ, we mean thatM satisfies φ. This is defined by:
(i)M 2 ⊥,
(ii)M  p iff V(p) = 1,
(iii)M  φ→ψ iffM 2 φ orM  ψ,
(iv)M  t :φ, iffM  φ and φ ∈ ∗(t). a
Theorem 26 (Mkrtychev Completeness [50]) For any LP-formula φ:
LP(CS) ` φ iffM  φ for any CS-modelM.
Note that completeness here are relativized to specific constant specifications. In order
to show that a justification formulas is not provable in a logic armed by a constant specifi-
cation, it is sufficient to construct a counter model that admits that constant specification,
of the formula.
Fitting (Mkrtychev, modular) models, as semantic objects, involve syntactical con-
tents in the evidence function. This gives those models a somehow direct way to control
justifications in a logic. It is well-agreed that this kind of semantics is much more wieldy
than, e.g., arithmetical semantics.
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2.2 A Necessary Condition for Self-referentiality of The-
orems
This Section contains materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [72], with
the kind permission from Springer, the owner of the copyright of [72].
A notational remark: in this section only, R+ (R∗) stands for the transitive (reflexive
and transitive, respectively) closure of the binary relation R.
In Section 2.1, we introduced Kuznets results about self-referentiality of modal logics
T, K4, and S4. Those results can be seen as at a logic-level, i.e., which modal logic is
self-referential and which is not.
The candidate’s earlier (before becoming a student in the Graduate Center, City Uni-
versity of New York) work [68, 69] considered this topic at the theorem-level, i.e., which
S4-theorems need self-referentiality while being realized and which do not. The notion of
prehistoric loop was defined in a Gentzen-style sequent calculus of S4, and it was shown
that an S4-theorem is self-referential only if it does not have any proof that is prehistoric-
loop-free in that calculus.
Being an extension of [68], the candidate’s recent [72] performs the same idea in
both T and K4, the two (known) minimal logics that are self-referential. Both T and K4,
together with S4, is treated uniformly.
2.2.1 G3-style Sequent Calculi
Sequent calculi were invented by Gentzen [27], and later used in the proof theory of modal
logic by authors like Ohnishi and Matsumoto [53, 54]. Gentzen’s original idea have also
been improved and refined by authors like Ketonen, Kleene, Dragalin, Troelstra, Negri,
and von Plato, in a direction that leads to the G3-style sequent calculi, which generally
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“absorb” structural rules like Weakening and Contraction into other rules. Calculus with
G3-style flavor for modal logic may be traced back to Kanger [37]. Current formulations
are available in [63] and [52].
In [63], a sequent calculus of S4, called G3s, was presented, and then shown to be
depth-preserved weakening admissible, depth-preserved contraction admissible, and cut
admissible. Those properties make it a nice calculus based on which realization procedure
works, like in [14]. We include similar calculi for K4 and T in the coming definition.
Definition 27 (G3-style Calculi) Consider modal multi-set sequent calculus with rules:2
p,Γ⇒ ∆, p
(p is an atom) (Ax)




















In (Ax), (L⊥): p,⊥ are called principal formulas, and (formulas in) Γ,∆ are called
weakening3 formulas. In the conclusion of (L→), (R→), (L): α→ β,θ are principal,
and Γ,∆ are side. In the conclusion of (K) and (4): η,Θ are principal, and Γ,∆ are
weakening. In the conclusion of (R): Θ is side, η is principal, and Γ,∆ are weakening.
The distinction of principal, side, and weakening formulas is summarized in Table 2.2.
By correspondence, we mean the relation between, for instance, the displayed α oc-
currence in the left premise of (L→) and the displayed α occurrence (as a subformula
of α → β) in the conclusion of (L →). Each occurrence in the premise of a rule has
2In what follows, Γ,∆, ..., are multi-sets of formulas, and Γ is an abbreviation of {γ | γ ∈ Γ}. For
notational convenience, we may omit some “,” in sequents. Thus Γ∆ stands for Γ ∪ ∆, and Γα stans for
Γ ∪ {α}, etc..
3In standard textbooks like [63], Γ,∆ are called side formulas. Since we will distinguish side formulas
and weakening formulas in modal rules, and Γ,∆ here behave closely to weakening formulas in modal rules,
we call them “weakening” formulas.
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Table 2.2: Principal, Side, and Weakening Formulas in Rules.
Principal Side Weakening Principal Side Weakening
(Ax) p⇒ p × Γ⇒ ∆ (L) θ ⇒ Γ⇒ ∆ ×
(L⊥) ⊥ ⇒ × Γ⇒ ∆ (R) ⇒ η Θ⇒ Γ⇒ ∆
(L→) α→β⇒ Γ⇒ ∆ × (K) Θ⇒ η × Γ⇒ ∆
(R→) ⇒ α→β Γ⇒ ∆ × (4) Θ⇒ η × Γ⇒ ∆
exactly one corresponding occurrence in the conclusion of that rule. An occurrence in
the conclusion may have two corresponding occurrences in premise(s). For example, the
displayed θ occurrence (as a subformula of θ) in the conclusion of (L) has the two dis-
played θ occurrences (one by its own, the other as a subformula of θ) in the premise as
its corresponding occurrences. For another example, a formula δ in ∆ in the conclusion
of (L→) has two corresponding occurrences, one in the displayed ∆ in the left premise,
and the other in the displayed ∆ in the right premise. The phenomenon that two occur-
rences in premise(s) share a same corresponding occurrence in the conclusion is called a
unification. These terminologies are assumed to be generalized to structures defined on
occurrences in later subsections.
As in [63], we have in modal language that:
G3cp = {(Ax), (L⊥), (L→), (R→)},
G3s = G3cp ∪ {(L), (R)}.
Precisely, e.g., G3cp is the set of sequents closed under {(Ax), (L⊥), (L→), (R→)}. Also,
we have:
G3t = G3cp ∪ {(L), (K)},
G34 = G3cp ∪ {(4)}.
a
For each rule (R), by (
−→
R ), we mean several (possibly 0) continuous applications of
(R). Following [63], by G3[st4], we mean a calculus X ∈ {G3s,G3t,G34}. Similarly, if
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more, or less calculi are involved.
By G3[st4] `n Γ ⇒ ∆ (or G3[st4] `<n Γ ⇒ ∆, resp.), we mean that sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is
derivable in G3[st4] by a proof tree of height ≤ n (or < n, resp.). G3[st4] ` Γ⇒ ∆ means
G3[st4] `n Γ⇒ ∆ for some natural number n.
In the rest of this subsection, we will establish some standard results for those cal-
culi defined above. Those results are depth-preserved-admissibility (“DPA” for short) of
Weakening, DPA of Contraction, and Cut-elimination. In [63, Section 3.5, 4.1], those re-
sults are proved for G3c, a calculus extending G3cp in the first order language instead of
propositional modal language. It is easy to see that the proof there offers all we need for
G3cp. Then in [63, Section 9.1], a similar method is designed for G3s. Similar methods
work for G3t and G34.
Theorem 28 (DPA of Weakening) For any sets of formulas Γ, Γ′, ∆, and ∆′:
If G3[st4] `n Γ⇒ ∆, then G3[st4] `n Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′.
Proof. An easy induction on n. a
Theorem 29 (Depth-preserved Inversion Lemma) For any α, β, θ, Γ, and ∆:
(A) G3[st4] `n α→β,Γ⇒ ∆ implies G3[st4] `n Γ⇒ ∆, α and G3[st4] `n β,Γ⇒ ∆.
(B) If G3[st4] `n Γ⇒ ∆, α→β then G3[st4] `n α,Γ⇒ ∆, β.
(C) If G3[st] `n θ,Γ⇒ ∆ then G3[st] `n θ,θ,Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. (A) We generate the method of [63] for G3cp to accommodate modal rules.
When n = 0: α→β,Γ⇒ ∆ is an instance of (Ax) or (L⊥). This case is trivial.
Induction step: Consider (R), the last rule of `n α→β,Γ⇒ ∆.
Case (i): (R) is (L→) and the displayed α→β is principal. Take premises of (R).
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Case (ii): (R) ∈ {(L→), (R→), (L)}, and the displayed α→β is side:
`n−1 α→β,Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 `n−1 α→β,Γ1 ⇒ ∆1
`n α→β,Γ⇒ ∆
(R).
By IH, we have `n−1 Γ0 ⇒ ∆0α, `n−1 βΓ0 ⇒ ∆0, `n−1 Γ1 ⇒ ∆1α, and `n−1 βΓ1 ⇒ ∆1. Use
the same rule to get:
ǹ−1 Γ0⇒∆0, α ǹ−1 Γ1⇒∆1, α





Case (iii): (R) ∈ {(R), (K), (4)}. By Table 2.2, principal and side formulas of those
rules are all -ed, hence the displayed α→ β is a weakening formula. We can apply the
same rule, but with α or β as the weakening formula instead.
(B) Similarly.
(C) Follows directly from Theorem 28. a
Theorem 30 (DPA of Contraction) For any α, β, Γ, and ∆:
(A) If G3[st4] `n β, β,Γ⇒ ∆ then G3[st4] `n β,Γ⇒ ∆.
(B) If G3[st4] `n Γ⇒ ∆, α, α then G3[st4] `n Γ⇒ ∆, α.
Proof. Follow the method used in [63].
(A) When n = 0: β, β,Γ⇒ ∆ is an instance of (Ax) or (L⊥). Trivial.
Induction step: Consider (R), the last rule of `n β, β,Γ⇒ ∆.
Case (1): (R) is (L→). Subcase (1.1): Both displayed (in the conclusion of (R)) β’s
are side. Use IH. Subcase (1.2): Only one4 displayed β’s is principal. Use Theorem 29
and IH.
Case (2): (R) is (R→). Similar to Case (1).
4Note that in (L→), (R→), (L), there can be only one principal formula in the conclusion.
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Case (3): (R) is (L). Subcase (3.1): Both displayed β’s are side. Use IH. Subcase
(3.2): only one of displayed β’s is principal. Then β ≡ β0, and
ǹ−1 β0,β0, β,Γ⇒ ∆
`n β0, β,Γ⇒ ∆
(L).
Applying IH, we have ǹ−1 β0,β0,Γ⇒ ∆, and then `n β,Γ⇒ ∆ follows from (L).
Case (4): (R) is (4). Subcase (4.1): (at least) one of displayed β’s is weakening.
Apply (4) on the same premise, but without introducing that occurrence of β. Subcase
(4.2): both displayed β’s are principal. Then β ≡ β0, and
ǹ−1 β0, β0,β0,β0,Θ,Θ⇒ η
`n β0,β0,Θ,Γ⇒ ∆,η
(4).
By IH, ǹ−1 β0,β0,Θ,Θ⇒ η, and then `n β0,Θ,Γ⇒ ∆,η follows from (4).
Case (5): (R) ∈ {(K), (R)}. Similar to Case (4).
(B) Similar to the proof for (A). a
Let (Cut) rule be:
`a Γ⇒ ∆, φ `b φ,Γ⇒ ∆
`max{a,b}+1 Γ⇒ ∆
(Cut).
The rank of this (Cut) is the degree of cut-formula φ, notation dg(φ), and the level of this
(Cut) is a + b, the sum of depths of premises. A (Cut) with rank dg(φ) = r and level l
(resp. < l) is denoted by (Cutrl ), or (Cut
φ




<l)). We may use only
superscript or subscript, if we only care about the rank or level of a (Cut).
Remark: There is another version of cut rule in [63] (where our (Cut) above is called
context-sharing cut (Cutcs)):
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, φ φ,Γ1 ⇒ ∆1
Γ0,Γ1 ⇒ ∆0,∆1
(Cut′).
With the help of Theorem 28 and 30, it is easy to show that X ∪ {(Cut)} and X ∪ {(Cut′)}
derive exactly the same set of sequents. It is thus reasonable to work with (Cut) only.
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Theorem 31 ((Cut)-elimination) For any Γ and ∆:
G3[st4] ` Γ⇒ ∆ iff G3[st4] ∪ {(Cut)} ` Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. Follow the method in [63], recursively eliminate the minimal level maximal rank
(Cut):
`a Γ⇒ ∆, φ `b φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
(Cutφa+b).
(1): When dg(φ) = 0: φ is an atom p, or ⊥.
(1.1): One of cut-formulas is weakening. Trivial.
(1.2): One of cut-formulas is side. W.l.o.g., consider:
<̀a Γ0⇒∆0, φ <̀a Γ1⇒∆1, φ






By Table 2.2, (R) ∈ {(L→), (R→), (L)}, since only these rules may have side formulas
















where by double line, we mean an application of weakening or contraction. By Theorem
28 and 30, these structural rules are depth-preserved eliminable.
(1.3): Both cut-formulas are principal.
(1.3.1): φ is ⊥. (L⊥) has principal formula only in antecedent. This subcase is impos-
sible.
(1.3.2): φ is an atom p. Both premises are (Ax)’s:
`0 Γ⇒ ∆, p `0 p,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
(Cutp0 ).
By the form of (Ax), p ∈ Γ ∩ ∆, so Γ⇒ ∆ is also an instance of (Ax).
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(2): For induction step. Suppose that (Cutrl ) is eliminable for any r < r0, or r = r0 but




(2.1): One cut-formula is weakening. Similar to (1.1), where dg(φ) is not essential.
This is also the base case of sub-induction on level, since any cut-formula of degree > 0
can only be weakening in premises of a (Cut0).
(2.2): One cut-formula is side in (R) ∈ {(L→), (R→), (L)}. Similar to (1.2), where
the condition dg(φ) = 0, which holds there but not here, is only used to get the condition
that (R) ∈ {(L→), (R→), (L)}, a given condition here.
(2.3): Both cut-formulas are principal. Note that dg(φ) > 0.
(2.3.1): φ is α→β. This case is proved in the standard way (cf. [63]).
(2.3.2): φ is ψ.
(2.3.2.1): In G3t, only (K) has principal formula in succedent, and both (L) and

























In (K)-(K) subcase, we have:
à−1 Θ0 ⇒ ψ
`a Θ0,Γ0 ⇒ ∆,η,ψ
(K) b̀−1
ψ,Θ1 ⇒ η




where Γ0 ∪ Θ0 = Γ1 ∪ Θ1 = Γ. We can replace it by:
à−1 Θ0 ⇒ ψ
Θ0,Θ1 ⇒ ψ, η
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(2.3.2.2): In G3s and G34. Similar to (2.3.2.1).
(2.4): One of cut-formulas is side in (R), while the other is principal (in (R)).5 Thus
we have:
`a−1 Θ0 ⇒ ψ
`a Θ0,Γ0 ⇒ ∆,ψ,η
(R)
`b−1 ψ,Θ1 ⇒ η




where Θ0 ∪ Γ0 = Θ1 ∪ Γ1 = Γ. Replace this by
`a−1 Θ0 ⇒ ψ
`a Θ0,Θ1 ⇒ ψ, η
(R)
`b−1 ψ,Θ1 ⇒ η







Corollary 32 G3[st4] has subformula property.
We benefit from (Cut)-elimination in two points. The first one is, our G3-style calculi
are (Cut)-free formulations of corresponding modal logics, as presented in the following
theorem.
Theorem 33 G3s,G3t,G34 are formulations of S4,T,K4 respectively.
Proof. These calculi are equivalent to well-known Hilbert-systems. Associate to se-




∆. For one direction, the set of theorems in the
Hilbert-system are closed under (axioms and) rules of our G3-style calculus. For the
other direction, first note that all Hilbert-style axioms have their sequent forms derivable
in corresponding G3-style calculus. Closure under MP follows from (Cut)-elimination,
and closure under Necessitation holds since from⇒ η, sequent⇒ η is derivable by any
of (R), (K), and (4). a
5Precisely speaking, the remaining case is that one cut-formula is side in (R), and the other is side
in (R) or principal. By Table 2.2, side formulas in (R) are all negative, which implies that the positive
cut-formula is principal. Since the negative cut-formula is from (R), which determines the calculus (G3s),
the positive cut-formula is principal in (R).
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The second point that we benefit from (Cut)-elimination is, polarities of formulas are
preserved, which enables realization procedures in [2] and [14] to be applied.
2.2.2 Prehistoric Graph
Many notations will be introduced in this subsection as we go, and will be used in later
sections like Section 3.1 and Section 4.5. A Gentzen-style sequent proof (tree) is denoted
by T , with each of its node (a sequent) denoted by s1, s2, · · · , and its conclusion-premise
relation denoted by R. Thus the root of a proof tree is the conclusion sequent of that proof.
For any proof T and any sequent s in T , by T  s, we mean the subproof of s in T .
In all G3-style calculi presented in Subsection 2.2.1, all rules preserve polarities of
formula occurrences. Specifically, polarities are preserved for  occurrences. Based on
this property, families of ’s are defined in [2] and [13] for sequent calculi there.
We employ the same idea. A family is a set of related  occurrences. Corresponding
 occurrences in premise and conclusion of a rule belong to a same family. Extending
this to an equivalent relation, we can see that  occurrences in a proof belong to pairwise
disjoint families. We denote families by 1, 2, · · · , and an occurrence of  in family i by
i. All  occurrences in a family have a same polarity, which is defined as the polarity of
the family. Hence, it is notationally safe to denote a positive (or negative)  in a proof by
 (or ). A positive family is principal, if there is a positive  in that family introduced
principally in a modal rule (i.e., the displayed  in formula η in (R), (K), (4) in
Definition 27). In what follows, we say family i occurs in a formula φ, if there is a i
occurs in φ, or φ(i) in notation. we say i occurs in a set Γ of formulas, if there is some
formula φ(i) in Γ.
In [68], prehistoric relation is defined in G3s, on principal positive families. Based on
that idea, we extend that notion, make it more generally.
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Definition 34 (Prehistoric Graph) In a G3s, G3t, or G34 proof T , the prehistoric graph
P(T ) is defined as the directed graph
P(T ) := (F,≺L,≺R,≺),
where F is the set of principal positive families in T , all of ≺L,≺R,≺ are binary relations



























(4) is in T }.
a
Some results about prehistoric graphs were proved for G3s in [68]. We generalize
those proofs to make them work for G3t and G34.
Lemma 35 In a proof T , each family has a unique occurrence in the root.
Proof. In any rule in those calculi, each occurrence in a premise has exactly one corre-
sponding occurrence in the conclusion. a
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Lemma 36 In P(T ) of a proof T , for any i ∈ F, (i, i) <≺R.
Proof. Assume (i, i) ∈≺R. No matter which calculus T is from, there is a rule application
in T that puts (i, i) into ≺R. Moreover, in the conclusion of that rule, there is an occurrence
of iη(i). This occurrence has exactly one corresponding occurrence in the conclusion
of each step, and eventually in the root. Now there are two occurrences of i in the root,
which contradicts with Lemma 35. a
Lemma 37 In P(T ) of a proof T , for any i, j, k ∈ F:
(A) if k ≺R j ≺L i then k ≺L i; and
(B) if k ≺R j ≺R i then k ≺R i.
Proof. No matter which calculus T is from, k ≺R j implies that  jψ(k) occurs in a
sequent in T for some formula ψ. This occurrence has a unique related occurrence in the
root. Consider any occurrence of  j in a sequent s in T . By Lemma 35, This  j is related
to the occurrence of  j in  jψ(k) in the root. Thus, this  j in s is also in an occurrence
of formula  jψ(k).
(A) In G34, j ≺L i implies that
Θ( j),Θ( j)⇒ η
Θ( j),Γ⇒ ∆,iη
(4) is in T .
By the observation above, each  j in premise is in an occurrence of formula  jψ(k).
Hence
Θ( jψ(k)),Θ( jψ(k))⇒ η
Θ( jψ(k)),Γ⇒ ∆,iη
(4)
is in T . So we have k ≺L i. In G3s and G3t, similar proofs work.
(B) Proved in a similar way. a
Theorem 38 In P(T ) of a proof T :
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(A) (F,≺R) has no loop; and
(B) (F,≺) has a loop iff (F,≺L) has a loop.
Proof. (A) Assume that (F,≺R) has a loop i1 ≺R i2 ≺R · · · ≺R in ≺R i1. Using Lemma
37(B) n − 1 times, we have i1 ≺R i1, which contradicts Lemma 36.
(B) The (⇐) direction is trivial. For the (⇒) direction. Suppose that (F,≺) has a loop.
By (A), there is a ≺L step in this loop. If there are no ≺R steps in that loop, we already
have a loop in (F,≺L). If ≺R steps also exist, then the loop has a form of
· · · ≺ ix ≺R iy ≺L iz ≺ · · · .
By Lemma 37(A), we have
· · · ≺ ix ≺L iz ≺ · · ·
as a loop in (F,≺) with fewer ≺R steps. Doing this recursively until no ≺R remains, we get
a loop in (F,≺L). a
By saying P(T ) = (F,≺L,≺R,≺) has a loop, we mean (F,≺) has a loop, or equiva-
lently, (F,≺L) has a loop. A proof T is loop-free, if P(T ) has no loop. A modal theorem
is loop-free provable, if it has a loop-free proof in the corresponding calculus.
Theorem 39 (Decidability of Loop-free Provability) There is a mechanical procedure
to determine whether a modal formula is loop-free provable.
Proof. As a sequent calculus with sub-formula property, G3[st4] is decidable, and it
actually offers a decision procedure for the corresponding modal logic (cf. [22]). To
proof φ in G3[st4], one can take ⇒ φ as the main goal, and get subgoals via rules (in
the reverse direction from conclusion to premises), or close branches via axioms. Our
procedure to determine loop-free provability is based on this idea.
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In our setting, for all rules expect (R), (K), and (4), premise(s) are uniquely de-
termined after specifying the principal formula from the conclusion. For an (R), (K),
or (4) rule, after specifying the principal formula, we have options on carrying formulas
from the antecedent to the premise - formulas prefixed by  can either be seen as side or
be seen as weakening. If such a formula is seen as side, it will occur in the premise and
principal ’s in it will contribute to the ≺L in prehistoric graph. To make sure that we are
constructing a loop-free proof, we note down each of those edges involved, and a later
trial via (R), (K), or (4) is allowed, only if new edges it brings in do not form a loop
with existing edges. a
2.2.3 Realization of Loop-free Provable Theorems
In this subsection, we consider realizations of loop-free provable S4, T, or K4 theo-
rems, into corresponding justification logics LP, JT, J4, resp., with the property that
self-referential constant specification is not employed. Our method is based on the re-
alization procedure in [2]. Another version that has more similarities with ours came
from [14]. We present some preliminaries from [2] and [14], with necessary extensions to
fit our goal.
To deal with (R), Internalization Lemma is employed by realization procedures in
[2] and [14], through in different versions. For (K), a corresponding treatment can be
found in [46] with name Internalization Property. We present here a version that will
work in our setting. We denote series of terms or formulas x1, · · · , xn by X, φ1, · · · , φn by
Φ, and x1 :φ1, · · · , xn :φn by X :Φ, etc..
Lemma 40 (Internalization Lemma [2][46]) (A) In LP, from a derivation X : Θ ` η, we
can construct a derivation X :Θ ` t(X) :η for a term t.
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(B) In JT, similarly from Θ ` η to X :Θ ` t(X) :η for a term t and variables X.
(C) In J4, similarly from Θ, X :Θ ` η to X :Θ ` t(X) :η for a term t.
In all three cases, we can construct in such a way that no positive variables are intro-
duced, and if the original derivation has non-self-referential (non-direct-self-referential,
resp.) constant specification, then so is the constructed derivation.
Proof. (A) Inductively substitute formulas in original derivation by series of formulas as
follows.
Substitute axiom A by c : A, where c is a new constant.
Substitute hypotheses x :θ by
x :θ
x :θ →!x : x :θ
!x : x :θ
Substitute AN c : A by
c : A
c : A→!c :c : A
!c :c : A
For an MP on φ → ψ and φ in the original derivation, by IH, we have got sub-
derivations of s1 : (φ → ψ) and s2 : φ for some terms s1, s2. Combine these two sub-
derivations, and extend by
s1 : (φ→ψ)→ (s2 :φ→ s1 ·s2 :ψ)
s2 :φ→ s1 ·s2 :ψ
s1 ·s2 :ψ
Note that no variables are introduced, and we can always take new constant while
dealing with AN.
(B) Treatments for axiom and MP are similar to (A).
For each hypotheses θ ∈ Θ, substitute θ by x : θ, where x, being negative, is the only
variable introduced.
Substitute AN6 !n−1c : · · · :c : A by !nc : · · · :c : A.
6Note our special notation for constants in JT.
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(C) Treatments for axiom, AN, and MP are similar to (A). Here we have two kinds of
hypotheses. For each hypotheses x :Θ where x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ, substitute x :θ by
x :θ
x :θ →!x : x :θ
!x : x :θ.
For each hypotheses θ where θ ∈ Θ, substitute θ by x : θ, where x, being negative, is the
variable corresponds to θ in X :Θ. a
A corollary of Lemma 40 will be recalled later in Section 3.2.
Corollary 41 If S4 (T, K4, resp.) theorem φ is non-self-referential (non-directly-self-
referential), then so is φ.
Proof. Suppose φ is non-self-referential, i.e., there is a realization ψ of φ s.t. ` ψ holds
with a non-self-referential constant specification. Apply Lemma 40 on this derivation,
we got a derivation of t :ψ for a term t with a non-self-referential constant specification.
Observe that t :ψ is a realization of φ.
This verification works in all three pairs of logics, and the non-direct-self-referential
case is similar. a
Now we are ready to present a realization procedure that can realize a modal theorem
with a loop-free proof non-self-referentially. The idea was originated in [68], but for S4
only there. We now amend it to accommodate both T and K4.
Theorem 42 (Non-self-referentiality of Loop-free Theorems) Assume the following:
(i) X ranges over {T,K4,S4},
(ii) Y respectively ranges over {G3t,G34,G3s}, and
(iii) Z respectively ranges over {JT, J4, LP}.
CHAPTER 2. SELF-REFERENTIALITY IN MODAL LOGICS 46
Then for any X-theorem φ, if ⇒ φ has a loop-free proof in Y, then there is a normal
realization φr of φ in Z, s.t. Z(CS) ` φr for some non-self-referential constant specification
CS.
Proof. We prove this by presenting a realization procedure that works for all three modal-
justification pairs. The main idea is to incorporate an order, inherited from loop-free
proofs, in the realization procedure from [2].
We start with a G3[st4] loop-free proof of ⇒ φ, denoted by T . The “conclusion-
to-premise” relation of T is denoted by R, and notes (sequents) in T are denoted by
s0, s1, · · · , and specifically, the root sequent by sr. R+ and R∗ are transitive closure and
reflexive-transitive closure of R, resp.. Denote principal positive families by 1, · · · ,m,
and recall our notation of a  of family i as i.
Substitute ’s and non-principal ’s in T by variables x1, x2, · · · . In what follows,
there will be no further changes on those variables. So they will not contribute in forming
self-referentiality in constant specification.
There could be many (R), (K), or (4) rules that introduce principal ’s in a family.
Each rule introduces only one principal , and hence each rule is associated to a unique
family. In G3s, we denote (R)’s associated to family i by (R)i.1, · · · , (R)i.mi , where
mi is the number of those (R)’s. The only premise and conclusion of (R)i. j is denoted
by Ii. j and Oi. j, respectively. Similar notations for G3t and G34. Associate a provisional
variable ui. j to (R)i. j, (K)i. j, or (4)i. j. Substitute each i by sum of provisional variables
of family i, i.e., ui.1 + ui.2 + · · · + ui.mi . Later, ui. j will be substituted by a term, denoted by
ti. j, that comes from further treatment on (R)i. j, (K)i. j, or (4)i. j.
A formula, set of formula, sequent, or tree is provisional-variable-free, if there is no
provisional variable that occurs in it.
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What we have done so far is the first step of realization, called variable substitution.
Results of variable substitution on tree, sequent, rule (R), set of formulas, and formula,
are denoted by T ′, s′, (R)′, Γ′, and φ′, resp..
The second step of realization, called inductively substitution, offers inductively a
Hilber-style justification derivation of the modal theorem associated to each sequent in
T . It calls for Internalization Lemma and a substitution of provisional variables by
provisional-variable-free terms to go through (R)′, (K)′, and (4)′ rules.
In realization procedures in [2] and [14], inductively substitution is performed from
leaf-side nodes of T ′ to root-side nodes, and constants are only introduced while employ-
ing Internalization Lemma. We follow this line, but with the ε-function introduced. The
idea is, in G3s for instance, (R)′i. j is treated as the ε(i. j)-th one among all (R)
′ instances.
Taking care of the “leaf-side to root-side” requirement, we must guarantee that:
Oi1. j1R
+Oi2. j2 implies ε(i2. j2) < ε(i1. j1).
This is always possible on a tree, but we can have more restrictions, given the fact that T
is loop-free.
Claim 43 There is an ε satisfies all conditions above together with the condition that for
any j1 ∈ {1, · · · ,mh1}, j2 ∈ {1, · · · ,mh2}:
h2 ≺ h1 implies ε(h2. j2) < ε(h1. j1).
Proof. We claim that there is a principal positive family i1 s.t. h ⊀ i1 for any principal
positive family h. Otherwise, since there are only finitely many principal positive families
in T , there would be a prehistoric loop, which contradicts the assumption.
Similarly, we can show that there are families i2, i3, · · · s.t.: if h ≺ i2, then h ∈ {i1}; if
h ≺ i3, then h ∈ {i1, i2}; · · · ; if h ≺ iz, then h ∈ {i1, · · · , iz−1}; · · · .
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Since there are only finitely many principal positive families in T , we will enumerate
all of them as i1, i2, · · · , im in the way above. Thus, the desired ε is obtained by setting
ε(iz. j) = j +
∑z−1
w=1 miw for each family iz and j ∈ {1, · · · ,miz}. a
Note that by the ε from the proof above, once we treat an instance of family i, we will
not treat any instance from other families, until all instances from i are treated. Thus an
order of families is also respected by ε, and we can take ε(i) to denote the position of i in
that order.
Claim 44 There is a way of assigning names to families and an ε s.t.
h2 ≺ h1 implies h2 < h1.
Proof. Take ε as in Claim 43, and assume we happen to assigned names to families in a
way that ε(i) = i.7 Then Claim 43 implies what desired. a
We have a series of new constants ci. j.1, · · · , ci. j.mi. j associated with, say (R)
′
i. j, where
mi. j is the number of those constants. We always have enough new constants in each series,
so mi. j is determined by how much constants we need in treating (R)′i. j. In our procedure,
any constant ci. j.k is introduced at most once. Therefore, the axiom being prefixed by ci. j.k
is uniquely determined. We denote this axiom by Ai. j.k.
An application of AN.1 (or AN.2),
ci. j.k : Ai. j.k
(or
!nci. j.k :!n−1ci. j.k : · · · : ci. j.k : Ai. j.k
),
is ε-allowed, if Ai. j.k is provisional-variable-free, and does not contain any constant ci′. j′.k′
with ε(i′) ≥ ε(i) (or i′ ≥ i in our lucky way of assigning names to families). A constant
7This is just a matter of notation. There are no requirements on how we assign names to families (i.e.,
which family has number i as its name). Observations above show that ε can be taken to respect the order
of families, thus we may assume we happened to assign it in the way that cooperates with ε.
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specification is ε-allowed, if all formulas in it, as applications of AN.1 or AN.2, are ε-
allowed.
We perform inductively substitution ordered by this ε on T ′, round by round. Let T 0
be T ′ at the beginning. At round i, all instances of family i are treated. IH gives the
following items:
• A tree T i−1, which is obtained by substituting ti−1. j0 for provisional variable ui−1. j0
in T i−2 for each j0 ∈ {1, · · · ,mi−1}. (We have round-superscripted notations for sub-
tree, sequent, rule, derivation, set of formulas (e.g., constant specification), formula,
and term, whenever necessary.)
• A Hilbert-style justification derivation di−1i0. j0 of the modal formula associated to
Oi−1i0, j0 , with all provisional variables occur in it also occur in O
i−1
i0, j0
, and with an
ε-allowed injective constant specification CSi−1i0. j0 of d
i−1
i0. j0
, for each j0 ∈ {1, · · · ,mi0},
i0 ∈ {1, · · · , i−1}.
The goal of round i is to:
• Generate a provisional-variable-free term ti. j for each j ∈ {1, · · · ,mi}, and get T i by
substituting ti. j for ui. j in T i−1 for each j ∈ {1, · · · ,mi}.
• Generate a Hilbert-style justification derivation dii. j of the modal formula associated
to Oii. j, with all provisional variables occur in it also occur in O
i
i. j, and with an ε-
allowed injective constant specification CSii. j of d
i
i. j, for each j ∈ {1, · · · ,mi}.
Followed is a detailed instruction of inductively substitution.
From T i−1, take (T Oi. j)i−1 for each j ∈ {1, · · · ,mi}, to get a bunch of subtrees. Note
that those subtrees are pair-wisely disjoint, since otherwise, we would have (T Oi. j′)i−1
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as a proper subtree of (T  Oi. j)i−1, which would then implies that Oi. jR+Oi. j′ in T , and
then i occurs in Ii. j, and hence i ≺ i, contradicts with the loop-free assumption.
The following claim holds in our specified way of assigning names to families and
choice of ε.
Claim 45 (T  Ii. j)i−1 is provisional-variable-free.
Proof. For any provisional variable ui1. j1 that occurs in (T  Ii. j)0, we have i1 ≺ i, and
hence by Claim 44, i1 < i, which implies that ui1. j1 has been substituted by the provisional-
variable-free ti1. j1 and does not occur in (T  Ii. j)
i−1. a
Then, from each (T Oi. j)i−1, eliminate all subtrees (T  Ii0. j0)
i−1 for i0 ∈ {1, · · · , i−1}
and j0 ∈ {1, · · · ,mi0}. What remains are a bunch of pair-wisely disjoint tree-like structures
of sequents, where leaf nodes are axioms or O-sequents of earlier families, root nodes are
Oi−1i. j for some j, and despite of the last rule from I
i−1
i. j to O
i−1
i. j , conclusion-premise relations
are rules from (Ax)i−1, (L⊥)i−1, (L→)i−1, (R→)i−1, and (L)i−1.
We make a sub-induction on each of those tree-like structures, from leaves to Ii−1i. j
instead of Oi−1i. j , generate a provisional-variable-free Hilbert-style derivation inductively
on it. In this sub-induction, unless specifically mentioned, all objects are read as being
superscripted by (·)i−1.
Sub-leaf case.
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as the Helbert-style derivation desired. Note that all formulas in this deriva-
tion have occurrences in s, which is provisional-variable-free by Claim 45.
Thus this derivation is provisional-variable-free. The constant specification
of this derivation is empty, and hence is ε-allowed.
Similarly, if s is introduced by (L⊥).
If s is Oi−1i0. j0 , since Oi. jR
+Oi0. j0 , we have i0 ≺ i, and hence i0 < i by Claim
44. Then the main IH gives a derivation di−1i0. j0 of O
i−1
i0. j0
, with all provisional
variables in it occur in Oi−1i0. j0 , and with an ε-allowed CS
i−1




Oi−1i0. j0 is a sequent of (T  Ii. j)
i−1, by Claim 45, di−1i0. j0 is provisional-variable-
free.
Sub-induction step.
For sequent s introduced by (L→):
Γ⇒ ∆, φ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
φ→ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
.
By sub-IH, we have provisional-variable-free derivations dL and dR of the
two premises, each with an ε-allowed constant specification. We apply the
deduction theorem of Hilbert-style formulation (Lemma 4) to dR, and denote
the resulting derivation (
∧
Γ ` ψ →
∨
∆) by dR′ . Specifically, if we employ
the standard method to calculate, the resulting dR′ is also provisional-variable-
free, and the constant specification is not effected. Now what follows is a
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Despite of provisional-variable-free dL and dR′ , all other formulas are con-
sisted of Γ,∆, φ, ψ. All of them occur in the conclusion of (L→), which is a
sequent in (T  Ii. j)i−1. By Claim 45, all of them are provisional-variable-free,
hence so is the derivation above. The constant specification of the derivation
is the union of that from both side, which implies that each AN.1 or AN.2
in the resulting constant specification is inherited from an ε-allowed constant
specification. Thus, the constant specification of the derivation above is also
ε-allowed.
For a sequent introduced by (R→), also employ the deduction theorem,
and the case is similar but easier than the (L→) case.
In G3[st], after the variable substitution, (L) will have a form of
φ, t :φ,Γ⇒ ∆
t :φ,Γ⇒ ∆
.
For the case that s is introduce by (L), by sub-IH, we have a provisional-
variable-free derivation d of the premise. The desired provisional-variable-
free derivation of s is then gained by adding
t :φ
t :φ→ φ
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to the beginning of d. The constant specification is not effected.
This is the end of the sub-induction.
By this sub-induction, we have got a provisional-variable-free derivation of Ii−1i. j , with
an ε-allowed constant specification. The remaining step from Ii−1i. j to O
i−1
i. j can be treated
as follows.
(i) Apply the Internalization Lemma (Lemma 40) on the provisional-
variable-free derivation of Ii−1i. j , and get a derivation of
X :Θi−1 ⇒ ti. j :ηi−1.
The term t from Internalization Lemma is taken as our term ti. j, which will
be used later to replace ui. j throughout T i−1. Lemma 40 says, no new pos-
itive variables are introduced. Since provisional variables are all positive,
no provisional variables are introduced, and hence the resulting derivation is
provisional-variable-free. The constant specification of this new derivation is
got by adding all AN.1 or AN.2 used in Internalization Lemma to the orig-
inal ε-allowed constant specification. To show that the new constant speci-
fication is also ε-allowed, it is sufficient to show that all AN.1 or AN.2 used
in Internalization Lemma are ε-allowed, i.e., all axioms being prefixed are
provisional-variable-free, and do not have constants from ≥ i families. The
original derivation of Ii−1i. j is provisional-variable-free, so are all of its axioms.
Those provisional-variable-free axioms are exactly those being prefixed dur-
ing applying the Internalization Lemma. Constants from ≥ i families do not
occur in those axioms, since these constants have not been introduced by our
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procedure when generating the original derivation of Ii−1i. j . Hence, the new
constant specification is also ε-allowed.
(ii) Use axioms A4.1, A4.2 and rule MP to get the sum of ti. j with provi-
sional variables associated with other (R), (K), or (4) rules of family i.
The result is a derivation of
X :Θi−1 ⇒ ui.1+· · ·+ui. j−1+ti. j+ui. j+1+· · ·+ui.mi :η
i−1.
In this derivation, all provisional variables are in the family i, and constant
specification is not effected, and hence is ε-allowed.
(iii) Use Boolean axioms and rule MP to get weakening formulas of
(R)i−1i. j , (K)
i−1
i. j , or (4)
i−1
i. j . We may introduce some provisional variables
here, but all of them occur in Oi−1i. j . The constant specification is not effected,
and hence is ε-allowed.
(iv) Doing (i)-(iii) for each of tree-like structures of family i, we get the
desired series of provisional-variable-free terms ti.1, · · · , ti.mi . Substituting ui. j0
by ti. j0 for each j0 ∈ {1, · · · ,mi} in T
i−1, we get T i. Substituting ui. j0 by ti. j0
for each j0 ∈ {1, · · · ,mi} in the derivation generated above while treating
Oi−1i. j , we get the desired derivation d
i
i. j of O
i
i. j for each j ∈ {1, · · · ,mi}. Note
that all provisional variables introduced in (ii) are in family i, and hence are
eliminated by this substitution. So, all provisional variables remain are intro-
duced in (iii), and hence occur in Oi−1i. j . Within these provisional variables,
those from family i are eliminated by the substitution; the others, from later
families, are not eliminated. This substitution also brings Oi−1i. j to O
i
i. j, thus all
provisional variables occur in dii. j also occur in O
i
i. j. After (iii), the constant
specification is ε-allowed, and hence is provisional-variable-free. The sub-
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stitution above will only introduce new terms to positions where provisional
variables of family i located. Therefore, constant specification is not effected
in the substitution above, and is still ε-allowed.
To finish our proof for round i, we need to emphasize that, even in a later round i2 and
more provisional variables are substituted by corresponding terms, di2i. j is still a derivation
of Oi2i. j, with all its provisional variables occur in O
i2
i. j, and with an ε-allowed constant spec-
ification. Since substitutions of provisional variables by provisional-variable-free terms
are performed on both the proof tree (where O-sequent resides) and the derivation di. j, the
requirement for derivation and its provisional variables are satisfied. Later substitutions
of provisional variables by provisional-variable-free terms will not effect our constant
specification, which is ε-allowed, and hence provisional-variable-free.
Now we have finished the instruction for round i in the inductively substitution, and
also have proved some results. The base step where i = 1 of the inductively substitution
is similar but easier, with no earlier families, and hence no O-sequents to the leaf-side of
tree-like structures.
This is the end of inductively substitution.
After the inductively substitution, we have treated all (R)′, (K)′, (4)′ rules and all
rules to the leaf-side of them in T ′. We have also eliminated all provisional variables, and
got a Hilbert-style derivation of each root-most O-sequent, with the constant specification
of this derivation being ε-allowed. Since we have eliminated all provisional variables, all
those derivation are fully in LP, JT, or J4. From those O-sequents to the root smr in T
m,
all rules are (Ax)m, (L⊥)m, (L→)m, (R→)m, and (L)m. We can go through those rules just
like what we did in inductively substitution. The result will be a derivation of smr fully in
LP, JT, or J4. In out treatment for rules in inductively substitution, (Ax), (L⊥), (R→),
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(L) have no effect on constant specification; the case for (L→) will union two constant
specification’s from premises, but will get an ε-allowed constant specification, if both
constant specification’s from premises are ε-allowed. Thus, the constant specification of
the derivation of the root sequent is also ε-allowed. We denote this constant specification
by CS′′.
This is the end of realization procedure. Since we assign distinct variables to negative
modalities, and CS′′ is injective, the resulting realization is normal.
In the very beginning, we are given a loop-free proof T of ⇒ φ. That is, sr is ⇒ φ,
hence smr has the form of ⇒ ψ. Having eliminated all provisional variables, ψ is an LP,
JT, or J4 formula. From sr, through s′r, then s
1
r , · · · , till s
m
r , only ’s in φ are substituted by
variables, or sums of provisional variables, and then provisional variables are substituted
by terms. Thus ψ is a realization of φ. The generated Hilbert-style derivation of smr is then
a derivation ` ψ, with an ε-allowed CS′′.
To conclude our proof, it is sufficient to show that CS′′ is not self-referential. Suppose
that it were self-referential, then in S4 and J4 cases,
ci1. j1.k1 : Ai1. j1.k1(ci2. j2.k2),
· · · · · ·
ciz−1. jz−1.kz−1 : Aiz−1. jz−1.kz−1(ciz. jz.kz),
ciz. jz.kz : Aiz. jz.kz(ci1. j1.k1)
 ⊆ CS
′′;
and in JT case,
!n1ci1. j1.k1 : · · · : ci1. j1.k1 : Ai1. j1.k1(ci2. j2.k2),
· · · · · ·
!nz−1ciz−1. jz−1.kz−1 : · · · : ciz−1. jz−1.kz−1 : Aiz−1. jz−1.kz−1(ciz. jz.kz),
!nzciz. jz.kz : · · · : ciz. jz.kz : Aiz. jz.kz(ci1. j1.k1)
 ⊆ CS
′′.
In all cases, since CS′′ is ε-allowed, we have iz < iz−1 · · · < i2 < i1 < iz, which is
impossible. Therefore, CS′′ is not self-referential. a
The above theorem says, prehistoric-loop-free provable modal theorems are non-self-
referential, and prehistoric loop is a decidable necessary condition of self-referentiality.
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The procedure presented in our proof of Theorem 42 is essentially Artemov’s procedure
in [2] with some careful preservations of orders. The question that whether or not the
other direction of Theorem 42 holds has been open for years. Note that if it does hold,
then self-referentiality of model theorems would be decidable. This thesis, however, is
not able to answer this question. Instead, we will utilize what we have so far to explore
self-referentiality as much as possible, as we do in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
Non-self-referential Fragments
In Section 2.2, we have shown that for a modal theorem, prehistoric-loop-free provability
implies non-self-referentiality. The other direction, though has be desired for years, is still
open. So far, prehistoric-loop-free provability is the best known approximation of non-
self-referentiality, and similar ideas have been applied to other sequent calculi to prove
non-self-referentiality of theorems, like in [56] and [44]. While authors of these works
try to fit non-self-referentiality into the framework of substructural logics, we insist on
the the problem itself, understanding the collection of non-self-referential theorems in a
modal logic as a fragment of it, and explore properties of that fragment.
In Section 3.1, we study the fragment of a modal logic whose theorems are prehistoric-
loop-free provable as in Section 2.2.
Results in Section 3.1 will be employed in Section 3.2 to deduce properties of the
non-self-referential fragment. In these two sections, we will treat all of T, K4, and S4
uniformly.
Section 3.3 compares same kinds of fragments of T, K4, and S4, and shows that the
non-self-referentiality of a modal theorem can be sensitive to the choice of logics.
Many properties gained in this chapter about the non-self-referential fragment, even
about the prehistoric-loop-free provable fragment as its approximation, are bad in a tra-
58
CHAPTER 3. NON-SELF-REFERENTIAL FRAGMENTS 59
ditional point of view. This indicates that the notion of non-self-referentiality is not ad-
dressed so well by traditional logical tools.
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3.1 Prehistoric-loop-free Provable Fragments
We start with the definition of prehistoric-loop-free provable fragments.
Definition 46 (Prehistoric-loop-free Provable Fragments) We write G3[st4]⊗ ` Γ ⇒
∆, if sequent Γ⇒ ∆ has a loop-free proof in G3[st4].
The prehistoric-loop-free provable fragment of a modal logic X, notation X⊗, is de-
fined for T, K4, and S4, by 
T⊗ := {φ |G3t⊗ `⇒φ};
K4⊗ := {φ |G34⊗ `⇒φ};
S4⊗ := {φ |G3s⊗ `⇒φ}.
a
As a corollary of Theorem 42, any modal theorem that is self-referential is not loop-
free provable. For instance, we have the following corollary for Kuznets’ self-referential
instances presented in Table 2.1.
Corollary 47 (A) ¬¬(p→ p) < T⊗;
(B) ¬(p→ p)→⊥ < K4⊗;
(C) ¬¬(p→ p) < S4⊗.
Proof. Suppose that, say, ¬¬(p → p) ∈ S4⊗. By Definition 46, G3s⊗ `⇒ φ, which
implies that ¬¬(p → p) has a realization in LP that calls for a constant specification
that is not self-referential. This contradicts with Kuznets’ result Theorem 16. a
We will concentrate on these loop-free fragments and show their proof-theoretical
properties in the rest of this section. To get a start, we observe how prehistoric graphs are
changed by rules on sequents. By observing forms of rules and the definition of prehistoric
graph, we have what follows.
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Observation 48 (Effects of Rules of Prehistoric Graphs) (Ax) and (L⊥) each creates a
graph with only vertices but no edges.
Applying (R→) on the root of a proof T0 gives a larger proof T with P(T0) = P(T ).
Applying (L→) on roots of proofs T0 and T1, like
Γ⇒ ∆, α β,Γ⇒ ∆
α→β,Γ⇒ ∆
(L→),
gives a larger proof T s.t. P(T ) is the unification of P(T0) and P(T1) in the sense that:
vertices from side formulas (those in Γ and ∆) are unified as formulas are unified; vertices
from active formulas α, β are preserved; edges are changed along with vertices they go
from and to.
In G3s and G3t, (L) is the only rule that can unify two occurrences in a same sequent.




From P(T0) to P(T ), only vertices in active θ and θ in the premise are unified; edges are
changed along with vertices.
In G3s, (R) is the only rule that can introduce new edges. Suppose we use (R) on
the root of a proof T0 with P(T0) = (F0,≺0L,≺
0
R,≺




Then P(T ) = (F,≺L,≺R,≺), and in which F = F0 ∪ { j} ∪ {x | x occurs in Γ or in ∆},
≺L=≺
0
L ∪{(x, j) | x occurs in  Θ}, and ≺R=≺
0
R ∪{(x, j)| x occurs in η}.
(K) is the only rule in G3t that can introduce new edges. Effects of (K) in G3t is
quite same as that of (R) in G3s.
In G34, (4) is the only modal rule. It unifies vertices like what (L) does in G3s,
while introducing new edges like what (R) does in G3s. In more detail, applying (4)
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we get P(T ) by following steps: (i) unify vertices from active Θ and Θ in the premise
while changing edges along with vertices; (ii) add the vertex j and vertices from Γ and ∆;
(iii) add in ≺L pairs (x, j) where x occurs in Θ; and (iv) add in ≺R pairs (x, j) where x
occurs in η. a
Corollary 49 If T is loop-free, then any subproof of T is also loop-free.
Proof. Observation 48, together with an easy observation shows that once a loop is formed
in a subproof, there is no rule that can eliminate it (although we may unify vertices to
shorten the length of that loop). a
By unified formula occurrences, we mean displayed Γ,∆ in the conclusion of (L→),
displayed θ in the conclusion of (L), and displayed Θ in the conclusion of (4). By
the observation above, rules have different effects on prehistoric graphs. Those effects
include: introduce new vertices, introduce new edges, and unify vertices. It is helpful to
see what rules can make a loop, and how.
Lemma 50 Given loop-free subproofs T0 (and T1):
(A) Only (L→), (L), (4) can make a loop in P(T ).
(B) Only (L), (4) can make a loop of length 1 in P(T ).
(C) A loop is made, only if a pair of vertices from P(T0) (and P(T1)), each with edges,
are unified.
Proof. By Observation 48, neither (Ax), (L⊥), nor (R→) can make a loop.
In (L →), vertices from loop-free graphs P(T0) and P(T1) are unified, but without
introducing any new edge. Each occurrence from a side formula of one premise is unified
CHAPTER 3. NON-SELF-REFERENTIAL FRAGMENTS 63
with exactly one peer occurrence from the other premise. To make a loop, some chains
from P(T0) and P(T1) are connected by unifying the minimal of a chain to the maximal
of another chain from the other premise. The simplest case is, we have two chains, each
from one premise. That is,
10≺20≺· · ·≺ i0 in P(T0) and 11≺21≺· · ·≺ j1 in P(T1),
with i0 and 11 being unified, j1 and 10 being unified. The loop formed is:
10≺20≺· · ·≺ i0(≡11)≺21≺· · ·≺ j1(≡10).
Since P(T0) is loop free, 10, 20, · · · , i0 are pairwisely distinct, so are 11, 21, · · · , j1. In
another word, each chain will have two distinct vertices contributed to the loop. Thus, the
loop formed has length > 1.
In (L) vertices from θ,θ in loop-free P(T0) are unified, but without introducing any
new edge. To make a loop, chain(s) from P(T0) are connected by unifying minimal and
maximal vertices. The simplest case is, we have only one chain 1 ≺ 2 ≺ · · · ≺ i in P(T0),
and then 1 is unified with i. The loop formed is
1≺2≺· · ·≺ i(≡1).
If i = 2 in P(T0), then the formed loop has length 1.
By Observation 48, (R) and (K) do not unify vertices, and all edges they may add
go to the vertex being principally introduced by them (vertex j in Observation 48). This
vertex, however, does not exist in P(T0), and hence has out-degree 0 in P(T ). Other
vertices and edges from P(T0) are not effected, hence P(T ) is also loop-free.
By Observation 48, the effect of (4) can be seen as a “multi-(L)”, followed by an
(R). Based on previous cases, we know that (4) can make loops by “multi-(L)” effect,
but the (R)-effect cannot make a loop.
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In all cases above, only unification of vertices with edges can make a loop. a
Loop-free fragments have some nice closure properties. Here is the first one. Recall





which means, if φ is provable as a theorem, then so is φ.
Theorem 51 (Closure under Necessitation and De-necessitation) For any φ:
(A) G3[st4]⊗ `⇒ φ iff G3[st4]⊗ `⇒ φ.
(B) For X ∈ {S4,T,K4}, we have φ ∈ X⊗ iff φ ∈ X⊗.
Proof. (A) For one direction, suppose that we have a loop-free proof of⇒ φ. Applying
an (R), (K), or (4) (depending on the calculus) on the root sequent gives a proof of
⇒ φ. By Lemma 50, neither (R) nor (K) can make a loop. In the case that the rule
applied is (4), the antecedent (where unification happens) is empty. Thus there is no
unification to make a loop.
For the other direction, suppose that we have a loop-free proof of ⇒ φ. By an
observation of all our rules, we know that the last rule of that proof is (R), (K), or (4)
(depending on the calculus), and the premise of that rule is ⇒ φ. By Corollary 49, the
subproof with⇒ φ as root is also loop-free.
(B) A direct consequence of (A). a
Other closure properties will be presented once we are ready to prove them. We now
define isolated occurrence, which is a formula occurrence with all vertices from it having
no edge, and hence is “safe” for unification.
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Definition 52 (Isolated Occurrence) In proof T , a (formula or subformula) occurrence
φ in the root is isolated, if all vertices from φ have no edges. More precisely, if in P(T ) =
(F,≺L,≺R,≺), we have ≺⊆ (F\Fφ)×(F\Fφ), where Fφ := {i ∈ F | i occurs in φ}. a
Lemma 53 Applying a rule (R) on loop-free subproof(s) to get T . Assume that each
unified formula of (R) has a corresponding occurrence being isolated in the subproof of
the premise it resides, then T is also loop-free.
Proof. Each pair of vertices being unified occur in a pair of formula-occurrences being
unified. By assumption, in each such pair of occurrences, there is one occurrence being
isolated in the premise it comes from. Vertices from this occurrence has no edge in the
prehistoric graph of that premise. By Lemma 50, to make a loop, we need at least one
pair of vertices, each with edge in the graph of premise, to be unified. Now we see this is
impossible under our assumption. a
Lemma 54 Suppose that we apply (L→), (R→), or (L), on T0 (and T1) to get T . If a
formula occurrence φ in the root of T has all of its corresponding occurrences isolated in
T0 (and T1), then φ is isolated in T .
Proof. By Observation 48, none of (L→), (R→), and (L) can introduce new edges.
Thus each edge in P(T ) has corresponding edge(s) from at least one premise. If φ is
not isolated in T , then there is an edge going from (or to) a vertex from φ. This edge
has a corresponding edge, w.l.o.g., in P(T0), which means that φ is not isolated in T0, a
contradiction. a
To highlight isolated formula occurrences, we employ a notation. For proof T and
sequent s in T , if φ is isolated in T  s, then we highlight this fact by putting this φ in a
pair of 〈〉, like 〈φ〉, in s. Recall that T  s is the subproof of sequent s in T .
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Theorem 55 (Loop-free Admissible of Weakening) (A) If sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ has a proof
T with prehistoric graph P(T ), then sequent Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′,∆ has a proof T ′ of the same
height, and with prehistoric graph P(T ′) that is a disjoint union of an isomorphic copy of
P(T ) and a graph with vertices from Γ′ or from ∆′ and no edges. In another word, edges
in P(T ′) are exactly edges in P(T ), and formulas in Γ′,∆′ are isolated.
(B) G3[st4]⊗ `n Γ⇒ ∆ implies G3[st4]⊗ `n Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′,∆.
Proof. (A) Consider the following algorithm.
Start by adding Γ′ and ∆′ at the root of T . Go from conclusion to premises of each rule
in T , step by step, put Γ′ and ∆′ as side formulas in more and more sequents in T , until
there is an (Ax), (L⊥), (R), (K), or (4), where Γ′ and ∆′ can been seen as weakening
formulas introduced.
Note that in the resulting proof T ′, all occurrences of Γ′ and ∆′ are to the root-side of
any (R), (K), or (4). Occurrences Γ′ and ∆′ are introduced as weakening formulas,
and hence are isolated there. Then they are either inherited, or unified with only other
occurrences of Γ′ and ∆′, which are also isolated, by only (L→), (R→), and (L). By
Lemma 54, Γ′ and ∆′ are isolated everywhere they appear.
Therefore, in P(T ′), vertices from Γ′ and ∆′ have no edges, which means all edges in
P(T ′) are inherited from P(T ).
(B) An easy consequence of (A). a
We have shown in Theorem 28 that our G3-calculi are closed under weakening. Now
Theorem 55 says that applying the derivable weakening will not introduce loop in prehis-
toric graph. From now on, we use (W) to denote an application of weakening:
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ, 〈Γ′〉 ⇒ 〈∆′〉,∆
(W).
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This rule is allowed anywhere in a loop-free proof.














According to Observation 48, the only effect of (L) is the unification of the two active
θ’s in the premise (one by its own, one as a subformula of θ). In the application of (L)
in (LW), one of the unified θ-occurrence is from the isolated θ just introduced by the
(W), and hence the application of (LW) on the root of a proof T0 gives a larger proof T
with P(T0) = P(T ). Specifically, if P(T0) is loop-free, then so is P(T ).




which can be seen as an abbreviation of
Θ⇒ η




and does not make a loop.
In this thesis, ¬η is defined as an abbreviation of η→⊥. This saves us rules about ¬ in
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Within them, (L¬) can be seen as an abbreviation of
⊥, 〈Γ〉 ⇒ 〈∆〉 Γ⇒ ∆, η
η→⊥,Γ⇒ ∆
(L→),
where one copy of side formulas unified by (L→) is isolated. Thus, an application of (L¬)






where (W) even does not introduce a vertex and (R→) simply preserves the graph. Thus,
an application of (R¬) cannot make a loop.
In summary, the we have the following fact.
Fact 56 (Loop-free Admissible Rules) All of (Ax), (L⊥), (L¬), (R¬), (R→), (R), (K),
(W), (LW), and (4W) (whenever applicable) are admissible in G3[st4]⊗.
Lemma 57 G3[st4]⊗ ` φ⇒ φ for any φ.
Proof. Induction on φ.
(i) Trivial for prime formulas.











where α⇒ α and β⇒ β are given by IH. By Theorem 55, (W) is allowed to introduce
isolated formulas. In the displayed (L→), a pair of side α-occurrences are unified, with
the occurrence from right premise being isolated. Similarly for a pair of side β’s. By
Lemma 53, we can apply this (L→) without introducing a loop in prehistoric graph.
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where ψ ⇒ ψ follows from IH, (W) is allowed by Theorem 55, (L) and (4) is allowed
by Lemma 53, (R) and (K) cannot make a loop (by Lemma 50). a
We are ready to show the last closure property in this section, the closure under uni-
form substitution.
Theorem 58 (Closure under Substitution) For any φ, ψ, Γ, ∆, and atom p:
(A) G3[st4]⊗ ` Γ⇒ ∆ implies G3[st4]⊗ ` Γ[p/ψ]⇒ ∆[p/ψ].
(B) φ ∈ X⊗ implies φ[p/ψ] ∈ X⊗ for X ∈ {S4,T,K4}.
Proof. (A) We present an effective procedure to generate a proof of Γ[p/ψ] ⇒ ∆[p/ψ],
and then show that it is actually loop-free.
By assumption, we have a G3[st4]⊗ proof of Γ ⇒ ∆. Denote this proof by T0. Sub-
stitute each occurrence of p in T0 by ψ, and denote the resulting tree by T1. Clearly, all
applications of rules except (Ax)’s with p as principal formula become an application of
the same rule in T1, and each application of (Ax) with form
p,Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, p
becomes ψ,Γ0[p/ψ] ⇒ ∆0[p/ψ], ψ, which is temporally called a principal-ψ sequent.
That is, except principal-ψ sequents, T1 is a G3[st4]-proof of Γ[p/ψ]⇒ ∆[p/ψ].
By Lemma 57, there is a loop-free proof of ψ ⇒ ψ. Denote it by Tψ. Substitute each
principal-ψ sequent with form ψ,Γ0[p/ψ]⇒ ∆0[p/ψ], ψ in T1 by
Tψ
ψ⇒ ψ
ψ, 〈Γ0[p/ψ]〉 ⇒ 〈∆0[p/ψ]〉, ψ
(W),
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we get T2. Since Tψ is loop-free, and (W) is eliminable without introducing any loop
(Theorem 55), we know that this gives principal-ψ sequents G3[st4]⊗-proofs in T2, and
hence T2 is a G3[st4]-proof of Γ[p/ψ] ⇒ ∆[p/ψ]. What remains is to show that T2 is
loop-free.
For each sequent s in T2, let P(T2  s) = (F s,≺sL,≺
s
R,≺
s) be the graph of the subproof
of s in T2. Sequent s in T2 that is not above any principal-ψ sequent has corresponding
sequent in T0, which is denoted by s′. For sequent s not above any principal-ψ sequent,
let F sψ be the set of vertices in P(T2  s) that are from occurrences of ψ’s substituted in,
1
and let







where Bsψ := B
s  (F sψ × F
s
ψ) for B ∈ {≺L,≺R,≺}, be the subgraph of P(T2  s) that contains

























), etc.. Note that F s is a disjoint union of
F sψ and F
s
ψ
, but it is more complex for edges. For instance, ≺sL may contains edges in
neither ≺sLψ nor ≺
s
Lψ




Temporally call these edges cross edges.
Now we are ready to show that T2 is loop-free. Any sequent s above a principal-ψ
sequent is in the loop-free subproof Tψ. By Corollary 49, P(T2  s) is loop-free. For any
sequent s not above any principal-ψ sequent in T2, we prove this by three claims.
Claim 59 There is no loop inside Pψ(T2  s).
1Thus vertices from an occurrence of ψ that has already occurred in s′ are not included. This distinction
is clear since a position occupied by a substituted-in ψ in s is occupied by an occurrence of p in s′, and
this occurrence of p is unified with only other occurrences of p in T0, which implies the substituted-in ψ is
unified with only other substituted-in ψ’s in T2.
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Proof. All vertices and edges involved by the substitution is not included in, and hence
Pψ(T2  s) is isomorphic to P(T0  s
′), which is loop-free. a
Claim 60 There is no cross edge that goes from a vertex in F s
ψ
to a vertex in F sψ.
Proof. Assume there is such an edge (i, j) where i ∈ F s
ψ
and j ∈ F sψ. By Definition 34,
this means i occurs in the premise of a rule (R) of G3[st4] that principally introduces
 j. Now j ∈ F sψ implies  j occurs in a substituted-in ψ, and hence the application of rule
(R) is in Tψ. Thus i occurs Tψ, and also its root sequent ψ⇒ ψ. This means that i also
occurs in a substituted-in ψ, which contradicts with i ∈ F s
ψ
. a
Claim 61 There is no loop inside Pψ(T2  s).
Proof. To prove this claim, it is sufficient to care about only vertices from substituted-in
ψ’s. Since we are talking about sequent s with corresponding s′ in T0, we can make an
induction on T0. By this induction, we will show that (abbreviated by (*) later in this
proof):






ψ), for any edge e ∈≺
s
ψ, there is a subgraph
2





G) of Pψ(T2  s), where Fψ− (resp. Fψ+) is the collec-
tion of vertices from ψ− (resp. ψ+), a negative (resp. positive) occurrence of
substituted-in ψ in s, s.t. G  P(Tψ) and e ∈≺G.
By (*), each edge in Pψ(T2  s) is in an isomorphic copy of P(Tψ), and hence has its
isomorphic image in P(Tψ). If Pψ(T2  s) has a loop, then isomorphic images of edges
that constitute this loop would form a loop in P(Tψ), which contradicts with the fact that
P(Tψ) is loop-free.
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We finish this proof by presenting the induction that verifies (*):
For s′ got by an application of (Ax) with principal formula p, s is a
principal-ψ sequent. If s′ is Γ, p ⇒ p,∆, then s is Γ[p/ψ], ψ ⇒ ψ,∆[p/ψ].
Recall that we use copies of a same proof Tψ to get ψ⇒ ψ throughout the
whole procedure, and the proof of s is got by further applying a (W) that in-
troduces Γ[p/ψ] and ∆[p/ψ]. By Theorem 55, this application of (W) can
introduce only vertices but no edges. Hence Pψ(T2  s) is a disjoint union
of a graph G  P(Tψ) and a graph with vertices from substituted-in ψ oc-
currences in Γ[p/ψ] and ∆[p/ψ] but no edges. Thus all edges are in G.
Also note that vertices of G are from the pair of displayed ψ occurrences
in Γ[p/ψ], ψ⇒ ψ,∆[p/ψ].
For s′ got by an application of (L⊥), or of (Ax) with principal formula
other than p. Since p is not principal in s′, we get s = s′[p/ψ] by an applica-
tion of the same rule. By Observation 48, P(T2  s) has only vertices but no
edges, and hence (*) is vacuously true.
For s′ got by an application of rule (R) with premise(s) s′0 (and s
′
1). For any
e ∈≺sψ, e = (i, j) is an edge between two vertices i and j from substituted-in
ψ(’s). Assume that e has no corresponding edges in ≺s0ψ ∪≺
s1
ψ . Then e is intro-
duced by (R), and hence Observation 48 tells us that (R) ∈ {(R), (K), (4)},
and the positive principal formula has the form of  jη. Now the fact that j is
from a substituted-in ψ implies that this substituted-in ψ is to be formed by its
subformluas at or under sequent s in T2. This means that an atom p is to be
formed by its subformulas at or under sequent s′ in T0, which is impossible.
Therefore, the assumption is not true, and e has a corresponding edge e′ in














G0) of Pψ(T2  s0),
where Fψ−0 and Fψ+0 are collections of vertices from a pair of substituted-in ψ
occurrences (denoted by ψ−0 and ψ
+




0 have corresponding occurrences in s. Denote them by ψ
− and
ψ+, and collections of vertices of Pψ(T2  s) from ψ− and ψ+ by Fψ− and Fψ+ .
All rules respect polarity, and hence no pair of vertices from Fψ−0 ∪Fψ+0 are
unified. Thus, vertices of G0 are bijectively mapped by the correspondence
to Fψ− ∪Fψ+ . Edges are changed along with vertices they go from and to.




R , and ≺
G0 are injectively mapped by the cor-














G) is an isomorphic image of G0,
and hence is an isomorphic image of P(Tψ). Note that e′ is the corresponding
edge of e in ≺s0ψ , located in its subset ≺
G0 , which implies e ∈≺G.
Therefore, for an arbitrary edge e ∈≺sψ, we have found a subgraph G of
Pψ(T2  s), with all its vertices (in Fψ− ∪Fψ+) from a pair of negative and
positive occurrences of substituted-in ψ in s, s.t. G  P(Tψ) and e ∈≺G.
This completes our induction.
a
By the above three claims, we know that P(T2  s) is loop-free. Suppose a loop exists,
and that loop has a vertex in F s
ψ
. Then Claim 60 prevent this loop to visit any vertex in
F sψ. This requires the loop to be in Pψ(T2  s), which contradicts Claim 59. Thus any
potential loop cannot has any vertex in F s
ψ
. This requires the loop to be in Pψ(T2  s),
which contradicts Claim 61. In summary, no loop exists in P(T2  s). This prove is
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finished, by letting s to be the end-sequent of T2.
(B) An easy consequence of (A). a
For ordered sets P = (p1, p2, · · · , pk) and Ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, · · · , ψk), let φ[P/Ψ] be an
abbreviation of φ[p1/ψ1][p2/ψ2] · · · [pk/ψk]. Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 62 For any propositional tautology φ (in the propositional language), atoms
P, and modal formulas Ψ, we have G3[st4]⊗ `⇒ φ[P/Ψ], and hence φ[P/Ψ] ∈ X⊗ for
X ∈ {S4,T,K4}.
Proof. Since φ is a tautology in the propositional language, G3cp `⇒ φ. Note that each
G3cp-proof is also a G3[st4]-proof, and viewed as a G3[st4]-proof, the absence of modal
rules makes the proof loop-free. By Theorem 58(A), G3[st4]⊗ `⇒ φ[P/Ψ], which further
implies φ[P/Ψ] ∈ X⊗. a
Consequences similar to Corollary 62 hold for modal cases.
Lemma 63 For any modal formula φ and ψ:
(A) φ→φ ∈ T⊗;
(B) φ→φ ∈ K4⊗;
(C) (φ→ψ)→ (φ→ψ) ∈ K4⊗ ∩ T⊗.








is loop-free. By Theorem 58(B), φ→φ ∈ T⊗.




p⇒   p
(4)
⇒ p→  p
(R→)
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in G3t and the proof
p⇒ p
〈(p→q)〉, 〈p〉, p⇒〈q〉, p
(W)
q⇒ q
〈(p→q)〉, 〈p〉, q, 〈p〉⇒q
(W)








in G34 are both loop-free. By Theorem 58(B), (φ→ψ)→ (φ→ψ) ∈ K4⊗ ∩ T⊗. a
In fact, similar arguments show, e.g., φ → φ ∈ S4⊗. But we prefer to put it as a
consequence of the following fact that the inclusion of sub-logics is preserved also for the
loop-free setting, or in another word, G3s has at least the same ability of avoiding loops
as G3t and G34.
Theorem 64 (A) G3t⊗ ` Γ⇒∆ implies G3s⊗ ` Γ⇒∆ for any Γ and ∆;
(B) G34⊗ ` Γ⇒∆ implies G3s⊗ ` Γ⇒∆ for any Γ and ∆;
(C) T⊗  S4⊗;
(D) K4⊗  S4⊗.













we get a loop-free proof in G3s of the same conclusion. To see this, by IH, we have a
loop-free proof of Θ ⇒ η in G3s, then Theorem 55, Lemma 53, and Lemma 50 allow us
to derive like displayed without introducing a loop.
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By Observation 48, both sides have exactly the same effect on prehistoric graphs, so we
get a loop-free proof in G3s of the same conclusion.
(C) T⊗ ⊆ S4⊗ is a direct consequence of (A), and it is sufficient to find a formula in
S4⊗ but not in T⊗. The desired formula is p→p, obviously not in T, and hence not
in T⊗. Lemma 63(B) shows p→p ∈ K4⊗, and hence p→p ∈ S4⊗ by (B).
(D) Similar to (C). a
We have just shown that the loop-free provable fragment contains all tautologies and
modal principles (in that logic). Followed that, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 65 For X ∈ {S4,T,K4}, any axiom of X is also in X⊗.
Proof. Any propositional axiom χ is a tautology, and can be written as φ[P/Ψ] for some
tautology (in propositional language) φ, atoms P, and modal formulas Ψ. Then χ ∈ X⊗ by
Corollary 62.
For modal axioms in T, (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ),φ→ φ ∈ T⊗ follows from Lemma
63(C).
For modal axioms in K4, (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ),φ→ φ ∈ K4⊗ follows from
Lemma 63(C).
For modal axioms in S4, (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ),φ→ φ,φ→ φ ∈ T⊗∪K4⊗
follows from Lemma 63. Then by Theorem 64, these axioms are also in S4⊗. a
Recalled that in Corollary 47, there are modal theorems in each of T, K4, and S4 that
are not included in corresponding loop-free provable fragments. The following theorem
is now a consequence of what we know.
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Theorem 66 (Non-admissibility of MP) If X ∈ {S4,T,K4}, then X⊗ is not closed under
MP.
Proof. By Theorem 65, X⊗ contains all axioms in X. By Theorem 51, X⊗ is closed under
Necessitation, hence Necessitation is admissible in X⊗.
Suppose with the seek of a contradiction that X⊗ is closed under MP, then MP is also
admissible in X⊗, which then implies X ⊆ X⊗, which contradicts with Corollary 47. a
Corollary 67 (Non-normalities) If X ∈ {S4,T,K4}, then X⊗ is not a normal modal logic.
Proof. Directly by Theorem 66 and Definition 6. a
In this thesis, prehistoric graph generally serves as a technical tool in the research of
self-referentiality. However, as instanced by properties shown in this section, prehistoric
graph is interesting by its own, and should be considered as a notion extending G3-style
calculi of modal logics. The framework of substructural logic (cf. [55]) studies sequent
calculi with restricted structural rules. With the notion of prehistoric graph, the introduc-
tion, weakening, and contraction (we call it unification on the perspective of formulas,
rather than sequents) of positive modalities are graphically presented. It will be an in-
teresting direction to explore the relationship between prehistoric graph and substructural
stuffs.
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3.2 Non-self-referential Fragments
We start with the definition of the largest constant specification that is non-self-referential.
Definition 68 (The Largest Non-self-referential Constant Specification) Let c (with
possible subscripts) stand for a constant and A stand for an axiom.
(1) The largest constant specification that is not directly self-referential, notation
CS
61 , is defined in J4 and LP as
CS
61 := {c : A | c 7 A},
and in JT as
CS
61 := {!nc : · · · :c : A | c 7 A}.
(2) The largest constant specification that is not self-referential modulo renaming,
notation CS 6, is defined in J4 and LP as
CS
6 := {ci : A | c j 7 A for any j ≥ i},
and in JT as
CS
6 := {!nci : · · · :ci : A | c j 7 A for any j ≥ i}
(Note here that we employ the notational convention of [13] for JT, hence c1, c2, ... here
are initial elements of series of constants, and the second constant in the series of c1 is
written as !c1 that contains an occurrence of c1.) a
Obviously, for a justification logic Y, if Y(CS0) ` φ for a constant specification CS0
that is not directly self-referential, then Y(CS61) ` φ. What less obvious is the case in (2),
which we will explain after the coming definition.
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Definition 69 (Non-self-referential Fragments) Let X ∈ {T,K4,S4}, and
let Y ∈ {JT, J4, LP} respectively.
(1) The non-directly-self-referential fragment of X, notation X61 , is defined by
X 61 := {X ` φ | there is a realizer r s.r. Y(CS 61) ` φr}.
(2) The non-self-referential fragment of X, notation X6, is defined by
X 6 := {X ` φ | there is a realizer r s.r. Y(CS 6) ` φr}.
a
Observe that, if a modal theorem has a realization that calls for a constant specification
that is not self-referential, that constant specification cannot have any subset of the form
{c1 : A1(c2), c2 : A2(c3), · · · , cn : An(c1)}.
Then, there must be a way of renaming constants so that no constant occur in an axiom
prefixed by a constant with equal or larger subscript. After this renaming of constants,
the resulting constant specification will be a subset of CS6 defined in Definition 68(2).
In Definition 69(2), in order to be included in the non-self-referential fragment, a nodal
theorem can take any realizer to be realized. The free choice of realizer automatically
covers the renaming of constants necessary for Definition 68(2) to make sense.
The following theorem is obvious.
Theorem 70 If X ∈ {T,K4,S4}, then X 6 ⊆ X 61  X.
Proof. Since CS6 ⊆ CS61 holds for each justification logic, by definition, we see that
X6 ⊆ X61 .
To see that X61  X, first observe that X61 ⊆ X holds by definition. By Kuznets’
results in Table 2.1, we see that X61 + X, which implies that non-equation part. a
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In the terminology defined in this section, Theorem 42 can be reformulated as follows.
Corollary 71 If X ∈ {T,K4,S4}, then X⊗ ⊆ X 6.
Proof. By Theorem 42. a
With this corollary, we have the following:
Theorem 72 For X ∈ {S4,T,K4}, any axiom of X is also in X6 and X61 .
Proof. By Theorem 65, all instances of axiom schemes of X are included in X⊗. Since
X⊗ ⊆ X 6 by Corollary 71, they are also included in X6.
Then by Theorem 70, X6 ⊆ X61 , and hence all instances of axiom schemes of X are
included in X61 a
The closure of non-self-referential fragments under Necessitation is actually already
shown as Corollary 41. We reformulate it in the current terminology.
Corollary 73 (Closure under Necessitation) If X ∈ {T,K4,S4}, then both X 61 and X 6
are closed under the rule of Necessitation.
Proof. By Corollary 41 and Definition 69. a
Having followed a similar approach as in Section 3.1, we are now ready to show that
non-self-referential fragments fail to close under MP.
Theorem 74 (Non-admissibility of MP) If X ∈ {T,K4,S4}, then neither X61 nor X6 is
closed under MP.
Proof. We verify for X6, and the case for X61 is quite similar.
By Theorem 72, X 6 contains all axioms of X. By Corollary 73, X6 is closed under
Necessitation, hence Necessitation is admissible in X6.
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Suppose with the seek of a contradiction that X 6 is closed under MP, then MP is also
admissible in X 6, which implies that X ⊆ X 6, which contradicts with Theorem 70. a
We do not give an example pair of modal theorems that can be realized non(-direct)-
self-referentially, while the result of applying MP on them cannot. Finding such an ex-
ample is not hard, since directly self-referential modal theorems given by Kuznets and
presented in Table 2.1 have Hilbert-style modal proofs with short lengths. Among appli-
cations of MP in the proof for each theorems, there must be a desired one.
Corollary 75 (Non-normalities) If X ∈ {T,K4,S4}, then neither X61 nor X6 is a normal
modal logic.
Proof. By Theorem 74 and Definition 6. a
In a Kripke model for modal logic, an implication is satisfied on a state if and only
if either the antecedent is not satisfied, or the succedent is satisfied. That is to say, satis-
fiability on a state in a Kripke model is closed under MP. The failure of closure under
MP of non-self-referential fragment indicates that on the modal layer, self-referentiality
cannot be characterized in Kripke semantics.
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3.3 Between Fragments of Variant Modal Logics
Both Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 present results for fragmentS of a specified modal logic.
This section takes care of relations between the same kind of fragments of different modal
logics. We start by the following theorem.
Theorem 76 (A) K461 ⊆ S461;
(B) T61 ⊆ S461 .
Proof. (A) For any φ ∈ K461 , there must be a realizer r s.t. J4(CS61) ` φr.
First observe that each J4-axiom is also an LP-axiom. Any AN.1 rule application in
the proof has the form of c : A where c B A. The J4-axiom A is also an LP-axiom, and
hence c : A can also be introduced by the AN.1 rule in LP. Besides, c : A remains as a
non-self-referential formula as in J4. Finally, both justification logic share the rule MP.
In summary, the proof of φr in J4(CS61) is also a proof in LP(CS 61). Therefore,
φ ∈ S461 .
(B) For any φ ∈ T 61 , there must be a realizer r s.t. JT(CS61) ` φr. The cases for axiom
and MP are similar to that in (A), whereas the case for AN is harder, since JT enjoys AN.2
instead of AN.1.
For each AN.2 application
AN.2 `!nc :!n−1c : · · · :c : A,
substitute this line by
AN.1 ` c : A
A3 ` c : A→!c :c : A
MP `!c :c : A
...
A3 `!n−1c : · · · :c : A→!nc :!n−2c : · · · :c : A
MP `!nc : · · · :c : A.
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The resulting proof is then a proof in LP(CS 61), which implies that φ ∈ S461 . a
This theorem says, in the power of avoiding directly self-referentiality, S4 is not weaker
than either T or K4. Recall that we have a similar result on the power of avoiding the
necessity of a prehistoric-loop in Section 3.1.
The other direction is interesting only if the formula is indeed a theorem of the smaller
logic, i.e., whether or not S461 ∩ T ⊆ T61 , and whether or not S461 ∩ K4 ⊆ K461 . This is
still open for the T case, but is shown to fail for the K4 case by what follows. Generally
speaking, we find a theorem
^p→^^p,
shared by all of T, K4, and S4, whereas it is further included in both T 61 and S461 , but
not in K461 .
We first show the following:
Theorem 77 (A) K4 ` ^p→^^p;
(B1) ^p→^^p ∈ T⊗,
(B2) ^p→^^p ∈ T6,
(B3) ^p→^^p ∈ T61;
(C1) ^p→^^p ∈ S4⊗,
(C2) ^p→^^p ∈ S46,
(C3) ^p→^^p ∈ S461 .
Proof. Since ^ is defined as an abbreviation of ¬¬, we have (after adding annotations
to positive ’s for convenience):
^p→^^p ≡ ¬a¬p→¬¬b¬¬p.
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(A) We present a proof of
⇒ ¬a¬p→¬¬b¬¬p
in G34.3
p ⇒ p (Ax)
p,¬p ⇒ (L¬)
p,p,¬p,¬p ⇒ ¬¬p (W)
p,¬p ⇒ b¬¬p (4)b.1
p ⇒ b¬¬p,¬¬p (R¬)
p,¬b¬¬p ⇒ ¬¬p (L¬)
p,p,¬b¬¬p,¬b¬¬p ⇒ ¬¬p (W)
p,¬b¬¬p ⇒ b¬¬p (4)b.2
p,¬b¬¬p,¬b¬¬p ⇒ (L¬)
¬b¬¬p,¬b¬¬p ⇒ ¬p (R¬)
¬b¬¬p ⇒ a¬p (4)a
⇒ a¬p,¬¬b¬¬p (R¬)
¬a¬p ⇒ ¬¬b¬¬p (L¬)
⇒ ¬a¬p→¬¬b¬¬p (R→)
Note that this proof has a prehistoric loop b ≺ b of length 1, introduced by the only (4)a.
As we will see in Corollary 82, this sequent is not loop-free provable in G34.
(B1) It is sufficient to give a proof of
⇒ ¬a¬p→¬¬b¬¬p
in G3t⊗.
A desired proof is as follows:
p ⇒ p (Ax)
p,¬p ⇒ (L¬)
p,¬p ⇒ (LW)
p ⇒ ¬¬p (R¬)
p ⇒ b¬¬p (K)
⇒ ¬p,b¬¬p (R¬)
¬b¬¬p ⇒ ¬p (L¬)
¬b¬¬p ⇒ a¬p (K)
¬a¬p,¬b¬¬p ⇒ (L¬)
¬a¬p ⇒ ¬¬b¬¬p (R¬)
⇒ ¬a¬p→¬¬b¬¬p (R→)
3We omit lines between sequents here.
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whose prehistoric graph has two vertices a, b, and only one edge b ≺ a introduced by the
second (K).
(B2) By (B1) and Corollary 71.
(B3) By (B2) and Theorem 70.
(C1) By (B1) and Theorem 64(C).
(C2) By (B1) and Corollary 71.
(C3) By (B3) and Theorem 70. a
Then we verify the fact that ^p→ ^^p < K461 , using a construction of counter
CS
61-Fitting model in J4.
Theorem 78 ^p→^^p < K461 .
Proof. Any possible realization of ¬a¬p→¬¬a¬¬p has the form of
¬ta :¬t1 : p→¬t2 :¬tb :¬t3 :¬p.
Recall that in Definition 21 and Lemma 22, we introduced the notation ∗X to denote the
closure of X under conditions there, and showed that ∗X is the smallest evidence function
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∗i\ j := ∗i \ ∗ j (this needs not to be an evidence function itself);
T0(p) := {p},





LetM := (W,R, E,V) be a J4 Fitting model where W = {u, v}, R = {(u, v)}, E(u) = ∗u = ∗3,
E(v) = ∗v = ∗2, V is arbitrary. In what follows, we will show that
M, u 1 ¬ta :¬t1 : p→¬t2 :¬tb :¬t3 :¬p .
Lemma 79 In a Fitting model, if formula t : φ is true at one state, then it is also true at
any accessible state.
Proof. Assume w1  t : φ and w1Rw2, it is sufficient to show that w2  t : φ. Take any
w3 accessible from w2, by transitivity, w1Rw3 and hence w3  φ. Note that φ ∈ ∗w1(t), by
monotonicity, we see that φ ∈ ∗w2(t). a
Claim 80 For any s B tb:
(A) If φ ∈ ∗0(s), then
(i) J4(CS 61) ` φ,
(ii) tb 6Bφ;
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(B) If φ ∈ ∗1\0(s), then
(iii) For any CS 61-modelM′ := (W ′,R′, E′,V ′) with u′ ∈ W ′, if V ′(p) = W ′ and
M′, u′  T (p), thenM′, u′  φ,
(iv) tb 6Bφ;
(C) If φ ∈ ∗2\1(s), then
(v) tb B φ,
(vi) If φ is an implication, then φ ≡ ¬tb :¬t3 :¬p,
(vii) φ . tb :¬t3 :¬p.
Proof. First observe that (iii), (iv) are satisfied if φ ≡ p, and (v), (vi), (vii) are satisfied if
φ ≡ ¬tb :¬t3 :¬p.
We prove the lemma by an induction on s.
(1) s ≡ c for a constant c:
(1A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(c). (1A1) Via initial set. In this case c : φ ∈ CS 61 , so φ is an
axiom and (i) holds. Suppose that tb B φ, then c ≡ s B tb B φ, which makes CS 61 directly
self-referential, a contradiction. (1A2) Via closure. Impossible since s ≡ c is a constant.
(1B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(c). (1B1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ p, hence both (iii) and
(iv) hold. (1B2) Via closure. Impossible.
(1C) Assume φ ∈ ∗2\1(c). (1C1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ ¬tb :¬t3 :¬p, hence all
of (v), (vi), and (vii) hold. (1C2) Via closure. Impossible.
(2) s ≡ x for a variable x:
(2A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(x). (2A1) Via initial set. In this case x : φ ∈ CS 61 , which is
impossible. (2A2) Via closure. Impossible since s ≡ x is a variable.
(2B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(x). (2B1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ p. (2B2) Via closure.
Impossible.
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(2C) Assume φ ∈ ∗2\1(c). (2C1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ ¬tb :¬t3 :¬p. (2C2)
Via closure. Impossible.
(3) s ≡!s1 for a term s1:
(3A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(!s1). (3A1) Via initial set. In this case !s1 : φ ∈ CS 61 , which
is impossible. (3A2) Via closure. So φ ≡ s1 : ψ for some formula ψ ∈ ∗0(s1). By IH(i),
J4(CS 61) ` ψ. Take an arbitrary CS 61-model M′ with a state u′ in it, let ∗u
′
= E′(u′) be
the evidence function on u′. Since ∗u
′
admits CS 61 , and ∗0 is the smallest CS 61-evidence
function, from ψ ∈ ∗0(s1) we see that ψ ∈ ∗u
′
(s1). For any state v′ in M′ accessible from
u′, by soundness, M′, v′  ψ. So we have M′, u′  s1 :ψ, and then J4(CS 61) ` s1 :ψ by
completeness, (i) holds. By IH(ii), tb 7 ψ. Since s1 is a proper subterm of s and hence of
tb, we see that tb 7 s1. Therefore, tb 7 s1 :ψ, (ii) holds.
(3B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(!s1). (3B1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ p. (3B2) Via
closure. So φ ≡ s1 : ψ for some formula ψ ∈ ∗1\0(s1) ⊆ ∗1(s1). Take an arbitrary CS 61-
model M′ = (W ′,R′, E′,V ′) with u′ ∈ W ′, assume V ′(p) = W ′ and M′, u′  T (p). Since




= E′(u′) is the




61 . Now we see ∗1(s1) ⊆ ∗u
′
(s1) from the fact that ∗1 is the smallest CS 61 ∪ {t1 : p}-
evidence function. So ψ ∈ ∗u
′
(s1) follows from ψ ∈ ∗1(s1). Now take any state v′ inM′ s.t.
u′R′v′. From V ′(p) = W ′ we seeM′, v′  p, i.e., M′, v′  T0(p). For any i > 0, formulas
in Ti(p) all have the form of t : α. By Lemma 79, M′, u′  Ti(p) implies M′, v′  Ti(p).
SinceM′, u′  T (p), we see thatM′, v′  T (p). By IH(iii),M′, v′  ψ. This, together with
earlier proved fact ψ ∈ ∗u
′
(s1) gives M′, u′  s1 :ψ, (iii) holds. By IH(iv), tb 7 ψ. Since
s B tb and s1 is a proper subterm of s, tb 7 s1. Therefore, tb 7 s1 :ψ, (iv) holds.
(3C) Assume φ ∈ ∗2\1(!s1). (3C1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ ¬tb :¬t3 :¬p. (3C2)
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Via closure. So φ ≡ s1 :ψ for some formula ψ ∈ ∗2\1(s1). By IH(v), tb B ψ, which implies
tb B s1 : ψ, (v) holds. As s1 : ψ is not an implication, (vi) holds. Since s B tb and s1 is a
proper subterm of s, we see that s1 . tb. Therefore, s1 :ψ . tb :¬t3 :¬p, (vii) holds.
(4) s ≡ s1 ·s2 for some terms s1 and s2:
(4A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(s1·s2). (4A1) Via initial set. In this case s1·s2 :φ ∈ CS 61 , which is
impossible. (4A2) Via closure. So there is a formula τ s.r. τ→φ ∈ ∗0(s1) and τ ∈ ∗0(s2).
By IH(i), J4(CS 61) ` τ→ φ and J4(CS 61) ` τ, which implies J4(CS 61) ` φ, (i) holds.
By IH(ii), tb 7 τ→φ, which implies tb 7 φ, (ii) holds.
(4B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1 · s2). (4B1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ p. (4B2) Via
closure. So there is a formula τ s.r. τ→φ ∈ ∗1(s1) and τ ∈ ∗1(s2). (4B21) τ→φ ∈ ∗0(s1)
and τ ∈ ∗0(s2). Then φ ∈ ∗0(s1·s2), a contradiction. (4B22) τ→φ ∈ ∗0(s1) and τ ∈ ∗1\0(s2).
Take an arbitrary CS 61-model M′ = (W ′,R′, E′,V ′) with u′ ∈ W ′, assume V ′(p) = W ′
and M′, u′  T (p). By IH(iii), M′, u′  τ. By IH(i) and soundness, M′, u′  τ→ φ. So
M′, u′  φ, (iii) holds. By IH(iv), tb 7 τ→ φ, which implies tb 7 φ, (iv) holds. (4B23)
τ→ φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1) and τ ∈ ∗0(s2). Similar as (4B22), using IH(iii,iv) on s1 and (i) on s2.
(4B24) τ→φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1) and τ ∈ ∗1\0(s2). Similar as (4B22), using IH(iii) on both s1 and
s2, and (iv) on s1.
(4C) Assume φ ∈ ∗2\1(s1 · s2). (4C1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ ¬tb : ¬t3 : ¬p.
(4C2) Via closure. So there is a formula τ s.r. τ→ φ ∈ ∗2(s1) and τ ∈ ∗2(s2). (4C21)
τ→φ ∈ ∗1(s1) and τ ∈ ∗1(s2). Then φ ∈ ∗1(s1 ·s2), a contradiction. (4C22) τ→φ ∈ ∗1(s1)
and τ ∈ ∗2\1(s2). If τ→φ ∈ ∗0(s1), then by IH(ii), tb 7 τ→φ. Otherwise τ→φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1),
then by IH(iv), tb 7 τ→ φ. In summary, we have tb 7 τ→ φ in both cases. Now IH(v)
offers tb B τ, contradicts with what we have. (4C23) τ→φ ∈ ∗2\1(s1) and τ ∈ ∗1(s2). As an
implication, by IH(vi), τ→φ ≡ ¬tb :¬t3 :¬p, which implies τ ≡ tb :¬t3 :¬p. Consider the
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modelM′ = (W ′,R′, E′,V ′), where W ′ = {u′, v′}, R′ = {(u′, v′)}, E′(u′) = ∗u
′
= E′(v′) = ∗v
′
being the full evidence function,4 and V ′(p) = W ′. Note that M′ is a CS 61-model as the
full evidence function admits CS 61 . By an east observation we see that M′, u′  T (p).
Since ¬p ∈ ∗v
′
(t3) and v′ has no accessible state, M′, v′  t3 :¬p. Thus M′, v′ 1 ¬t3 :¬p,
and by u′R′v′, we have M′, u′ 1 tb :¬t3 :¬p, i.e., M′, u′ 1 τ. If τ ∈ ∗0(s2), then by IH(i)
and soundness,M′, u′  τ, a contradiction. Otherwise τ ∈ ∗1\0(s2). Since V ′(p) = W ′ and
M′, u′  T (p), by IH(iii), we haveM′, u′  τ, a contradiction. In summary, both cases lead
to contradictions. (4C24) τ→φ ∈ ∗2\1(s1) and τ ∈ ∗2\1(s2). By IH(vi), as an implication,
τ→ φ ≡ ¬tb :¬t3 :¬p, and hence τ ≡ tb :¬t3 :¬p. This contradicts with τ . tb :¬t3 :¬p,
concluded by IH(vii).
(5) s ≡ s1+s2 for some terms s1 and s2:
(5A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(s1+s2). (5A1) Via initial set. In this case s1+s2 :φ ∈ CS 61 , which
is impossible. (5A2) Via closure. W.l.o.g., φ ∈ ∗0(s1), and all desired follow from IH.
(5B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1 + s2). (5B1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ p. (5B2) Via
closure. In this case φ < ∗0(s1) ∪ ∗0(s2), and w.l.o.g., φ ∈ ∗1(s1). So φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1), and all
desired follow from IH.
(5C) Assume φ ∈ ∗2\1(s1 + s2). (5C1) Via initial set. In this case φ ≡ ¬tb : ¬t3 : ¬p.
(5C2) Via closure. In this case φ < ∗1(s1)∪∗1(s2), and w.l.o.g., φ ∈ ∗2(s1). So φ ∈ ∗2\1(s1),
and all desired follow from IH. a
Claim 81 ¬t3 :¬p < ∗v(tb).
Proof. Consider the model M′ = (W ′,R′, E′,V ′), where W ′ = {u′}, R′ = ∅, E′(u′) = ∗u′
being the full evidence function, and V ′(p) = W ′. Note thatM′ is a CS 61-model as the full
evidence function admits CS 61 . It is easy to see thatM′, u′  T (p) andM′, u′ 1 ¬t3 :¬p.
4Recall that an evidence function ∗ is full, if φ ∈ ∗(t) for any term t and formula φ.
CHAPTER 3. NON-SELF-REFERENTIAL FRAGMENTS 91
Assume with the seek of a contradiction that ¬t3 :¬p ∈ ∗v(tb). Since ∗v = ∗2, we have
¬t3 :¬p ∈ ∗2(tb) = ∗0(tb) ∪ ∗1\0(tb) ∪ ∗2\1(tb).
Case (1), ¬t3 : ¬p ∈ ∗0(tb). By Claim 80(Ai) and soundness, M′, u′  ¬t3 : ¬p, a
contradiction.
Case (2), ¬t3 :¬p ∈ ∗1\0(tb). By Claim 80(Biii),M′, u′  ¬t3 :¬p, a contradiction.
Case (3), ¬t3 :¬p ∈ ∗2\1(tb). By Claim 80(Cvi), as an implication, ¬t3 :¬p ≡ ¬tb :¬t3 :
¬p, a contradiction.
In summary, none case is possible, and our assumption cannot be true. a
Now we are ready to show thatM, u 1 ¬ta :¬t1 : p→¬t2 :¬tb :¬t3 :¬p.
By Claim 81, ¬t3 : ¬p < ∗v(tb), which implies M, v 1 tb : ¬t3 : ¬p. By our definition
of ∗u, we have ¬tb : ¬t3 : ¬p ∈ ∗u(t2). Since v is the only state accessible from u and
M, v  ¬tb :¬t3 :¬p, we haveM, u  t2 :¬tb :¬t3 :¬p, and henceM, u 1 ¬t2 :¬tb :¬t3 :¬p.
It is therefore sufficient to show that M, u  ¬ta : ¬t1 : p. By our definition of ∗v, we
have p ∈ ∗v(t1). Since v has no accessible state,M, v  t1 : p. SoM, v 1 ¬t1 : p, and since
uRv, we haveM, u 1 ta :¬t1 : p, which implies the desiredM, u  ¬ta :¬t1 : p.
Have verifiedM, u 1 ¬ta :¬t1 : p→¬t2 :¬tb :¬t3 :¬p, we can draw the conclusion that
^p→^^p cannot be realized in J4 unless a directly self-referential constant specifi-
cation is called, since otherwise, the realized formula would be a J4(CS 61)-theorem, and
hence would have no counter CS 61-models by Theorem 24. a
As a quick corollary, we have:
Corollary 82 ^p→^^p < K4⊗.
Proof. Following Theorem 78, by Theorem 70, ^p→^^p < K46. Now Corollary 71
offers what desired. a
CHAPTER 3. NON-SELF-REFERENTIAL FRAGMENTS 92




















Combined with Theorem 77, we see that ^p→^^p is prehistoric-loop-free prov-
able in both T and S4, but not so in K4. Note that this is an analogue of the result on
self-referentiality of this formula, and hence the agreement of loop-free provability and
non-self-referentiality is still possible.
At the end of this chapter, we present two figures.
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between modal logics K4, S4, and their non-directly-
self-referential fragments. In this figure, inclusions of sets are obvious, except the fact
that K461 ⊆ S461 which follows from Theorem 76. The formula ^(p→p) is Kuznets’
instance for direct self-referentiality in S4 in [14]. This is not a K4-theorem, which draws
Kuznets’ later work [45] where ^>→^(p→ p) is found. Results in those papers are
summarized in Table 2.1. Facts about ⊥→⊥ and p→ p follow from Theorem 72. Facts
about ^p→^^p are found in this section, which completes this figure.
In the Figure 3.2 for T, inclusions of sets are obvious otherwise follow from Theorem
76. The formula ^(p→ p) is due to Kuznets [45]. Facts about ⊥→⊥ and p→ p
follow from Theorem 72. The fact that ^(^p→ p) is not provable in T is obvious,
and its direct self-referentiality in S4 follows from Theorem 88 in Section 4.2. It is still
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open that whether is the space marked by question marks is empty or not.
Given observations of this section, we know that it makes so sense to talk about
non-self-referential fragments of modal logic in general, and we have to specify which
modal/justification logic pair we are talking about.
Chapter 4
Self-referentiality in the BHK Semantics
In Section 1.2, we presented a brief introduction to the provability semantics of intuition-
istic logic, also known as Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics. The propo-
sitional part of this semantics is formulated in Gödel–Artemov approach that employs the
realization of S4 in LP. Thus, Artemov’s question about necessity of self-referentiality
also makes sense in this formulation of BHK semantics.
Kuznets’ result in [14] (Theorem 16 in this thesis) shows that as an S4-thoerem,
¬¬(p→ p) < S461 , from which we know that direct self-referentiality is necessary
for the provability semantics of S4. This does not answer Artemov’s question for BHK
semantics, since by an easy observation of Gödel’s modal embedding (·)4 in Section 1.2,
we notice that ¬¬(p→p) is not the image of any IPC-theorem under (·)4. The same for
other known embeddings (cf. [30], [17], and [63]). The first four sections in this chapter
present the candidate’s results in [70, 71] that there is no “basic” way to embed IPC into
S461 .
In Section 4.1, we define the class of basic embeddings, a natural extension of Gödel’s
modal embedding.
Then Section 4.2 provides a set of directly self-referential S4-theorems.
In Section 4.3, we see that the double-negation of each intuitionistically invalid tau-
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tology falls into the set found in Section 4.2 by any basic embedding. That is to say, no
basic embedding can map all IPC-theorems into S461 .
In Section 4.4, we see that even the purely implicational fragment of IPC cannot be
mapped into S461 by any basic embedding.
Finally in Section 4.5, we apply the idea of Chapter 3 on fragments to IPC.
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4.1 Basic Embeddings
This Section contains materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [71], with the
kind permission from Elsevier, the owner of the copyright of [71]. This Section contains
materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [70], with the kind permission from
Springer, the owner of the copyright of [70].
There are several known ways to faithfully embed IPC in S4, with minor differences
between them (cf. [30], [49], [17], and [63]). Three of them are presented in Table 4.1,
where (·)◦ and (·) are contained in [63], and (·)4 is the well-known Gödel’s “ each
subformula” embedding.1
Fact 83 ([63]) Embeddings in Table 4.1 are all faithful, i.e., for each (·)× ∈ {(·)◦, (·), (·)4},
IPC ` φ iff S4 ` φ×. Differences between these embeddings are minor, since by induction,
we see that S4 ` φ ↔ φ4 and S4 ` φ× ↔ φ+ for any propositional formula φ, and
any (·)×, (·)+ ∈ {(·)◦, (·), (·)4}.
Though differences between embeddings (·)◦, (·), and (·)4 are minor, they can affect
realizations in LP. When an S4-theorem is realized, each  is replaced by a term, hence
1In [30], Gödel presented a version of embedding along with some alternative options, say, whether or
not to add ’s in the ∧ case. The version Gödel presented has ¬, but not ⊥, as a primitive connective, and
hence looks slightly different. Except for this, if we take the alternative option that adds ’s in the ∧ case,
then the only difference between the resulting version and (·)4 is the outermost .
Table 4.1: Three Faithful Embeddings of IPC in S4.
(·)◦ (·) (·)4
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
p p p p
α ∧ β α◦ ∧ β◦ α ∧ β (α4 ∧ β4)
α ∨ β α◦ ∨ β◦ α ∨ β (α4 ∨ β4)
α→ β α◦ → β◦ (α → β) (α4 → β4)
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the resulting realization is quite sensitive to the exact syntactical form of the modal for-
mula. It is therefore reasonable to consider possible embeddings of IPC in S4 in a more
general setting.
In what follows, we consider the class of “basic” embeddings. This class initially ap-
pears in the candidate’s [70] with only the “unpolarized version,” and then appears in full
in the candidate’s [71] under the name “polarized basic embedding.” Since polarities make
no difference in results that will come in this chapter, we simply use “basic embedding”
in the general sense of “polarized basic embedding” from [71].
Definition 84 (Basic Embeddings) (1) A mapping from intuitionistic propositional for-
mulas to modal formulas, denoted by (·)×, is a basic potential embedding if it, together











(φ  ψ)×+ ≡ 
j+(k+φ×+  
l+ψ×+) for  ∈ {∧,∨},
(φ  ψ)×− ≡ 
j−(k−φ×−  








In these equations, the p, ⊥, , or→at the left side is called the source of the one at
the right side. Natural numbers h+, h−, i+, i−, j+, j−, k+, k−, l+, l− for  ∈ {∧,∨,→}
are called parameters of the embedding. There are 22 parameters for each basic potential
embedding. By saying that (·)× is a basic (potential) embedding, we assume that those
notations are all reserved for the parameters, in the way indicated above. Notations j+, k+,
and l+ are also reserved as abbreviates of j→+, k→+, and l→+, respectively. Similarly for
j−, k−, and l−.
(2) A basic potential embedding (·)× is unpolarized, if it satisfies φ×+ ≡ φ
×
−, or equiva-
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lently, if h+ = h−, i+ = i−, ..., l∨+ = l∨− all hold for the 11 pairs of parameters. In this case
we omit + or − subscripts in notations for parameters.
(3) A basic potential embedding (·)× is a basic embedding if it is faithful, i.e., if it
satisfies: IPC ` φ iff S4 ` φ×. a
Fact 85 The three embeddings in Table 4.1 are all basic embeddings, and are all unpo-
larized.
Proof. For example, (·) is the basic embedding for which h = j = 1 and
i = k = l = j∧ = k∧ = l∧ = j∨ = k∨ = l∨ = 0. a
Remark: As the reader may have observed, if we consider the embedding of IPC into
S4 by its own, it only matters whether a parameter has value 0, or a positive value, since
S4 ` φ↔φ. However, since the realization of an S4-theorem in LP is quite sensitive
to the exact syntactical form, we do not use this observation to simply our definition
of basic embedding. Another benefit of our general definition is, it can also be applied
to modal embeddings between other logics, e.g., from Visser’s basic propositional logic
BPL to K4 (cf.[64]). Though not included in this thesis, it will be interesting to see which
basic embeddings are faithful and which are not, for a particular pair of logics.
We will consider embeddings of some specific formulas under a basic potential em-
bedding, and it is straightforward but tedious to calculate them. Some examples of calcu-
lations are given in Example 86, and when using a calculation of this kind, we will say
“by calculation.”
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Example 86 Let (·)× be a basic potential embedding, then





(¬¬φ)× ≡  j+(k+(¬φ)×−→
i++l+⊥) ≡  j+(k+ j−(k−φ×+→
i−+l−⊥)→i++l+⊥)
≡  j+( j−+k+(k−φ×+→
i−+l−⊥)→i++l+⊥),





≡  j+( j−+k+(k−φ×+→
h−+l−q)→h++l+q).
By definition, these also give the embedding images under (·)×+. For the embedding
images under (·)×−, simply read each parameter as the one with opposite polarity symbol
(e.g., read j+ as j− and vice versa) in the equations above.
Some basic potential embeddings are faithful, some are not. We have the following
lemma, which provide some necessary conditions on parameters.
Lemma 87 For any basic embedding:
(A) j+ + j− + k+ + k− > 0,
(B) j− + k+ > 0,
(C) j+ + k− > 0, and
(D) h− + k+ > 0.





Under S4-provability, the formula above equals to (φ×+→⊥)→⊥, then to φ
×
+, and to φ
×.
Thus, S4 ` (¬¬φ)×↔φ×. Let φ be ¬¬p→ p, then S4 ` (¬¬(¬¬p→ p))×↔ (¬¬p→ p)×.
Note that IPC ` ¬¬(¬¬p→ p) and IPC 0 ¬¬p→ p.
CHAPTER 4. SELF-REFERENTIALITY IN THE BHK SEMANTICS 100
Assume with the seek of a contradiction that (·)× is faithful. Then S4 ` (¬¬(¬¬p→
p))× and S4 0 (¬¬p→ p)×. Thus we have a contradiction.
(B) Let (·)× be a basic potential embedding that satisfies j− = k+ = 0.
Case (i), j+ + l+ > 0. By calculation,








which is not a theorem of S4 no matter what value h+ and h− have. Since IPC ` (p→
q)→ (p→q), we see that (·)× is not faithful.
Case (ii), j+ = l+ = 0. By calculation,
(((p→q)→r)→ ((p→q)→r))× ≡  j+( j−+k+( j++k−(k+ p×−→
l+q×+)→
l−r×−)











By (A), j+ + j− + k+ + k− > 0. Given j+ = j− = k+ = 0 by assumption, we have k− > 0,
and hence the formula above is not provable in S4 no matter what value h+ and h− have.
Since IPC ` ((p→q)→r)→ ((p→q)→r), the embedding (·)× is not faithful.
In summary, (·)× is not faithful in both cases.
(C) Let (·)× be a basic potential embedding that satisfies j+ = k− = 0. By calculation,








By (A), we have j− + k+ > 0, and hence the formula above is provable in S4 no matter
what value h+ and h− have. Since IPC 0 ((p→ q)→ p)→ p, we know that (·)× is not
faithful.
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(D) Let (·)× be a basic potential embedding that satisfies h− = k+ = 0. Suppose with
the seek of a contradiction that (·)× is faithful.
Case (i), h+ + j+ + l+ > 0. Since IPC ` p→ (q→ p), we should have S4 ` (p→ (q→
p))×.
By calculation,
(p→ (q→ p))× ≡  j+(h−+k+ p→ j++l+(h−+k+q→h++l+ p))
≡  j+(p→ j++l+(q→h++l+ p)),
If this is an S4-theorem, then S4 ` p→ j++l+(q→h++l+ p).
If j+ + l+ > 0, then S4 ` p→(q→h++l+ p), which is not the case.
So j+ = l+ = 0, and hence we should have S4 ` p → (q → h++l+ p). Since h+ +
j+ + l+ > 0 by assumption of this case, we have h+ > 0, and hence we should have
S4 ` p→ (q→p), which is not the case.
Neither subcase is possible, we have a contradiction.
Case (ii), h+ = j+ = l+ = 0. Since IPC ` ((((p→ q)→ p)→ p)→ q)→ q, we should
have S4 ` (((((p→q)→ p)→ p)→q)→q)×.
By calculation,
(((((p→q)→ p)→ p)→q)→q)×
≡  j+( j−+k+(
 j++k−( j−+k+( j++k−(h−+k+ p→h++l+q)→h−+l− p)→h++l+ p)→h−+l−q
)→h++l+q)
≡  j−(k−( j−(k−(p→q)→l− p)→ p)→l−q)→q
Since j+ = 0 and k+ = 0, we have k− > 0 and j− > 0 by (C) and (B), respectively. Thus, if
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the formula above is an S4-theorem, then
S4 ` ((((p→q)→l− p)→ p)→l−q)→q,
which is not the case, a contradiction.
In summary, each case leads to a contradiction, and hence (·)× is not faithful. a
At the end of this section, we have some discussions about the basic embedding.
Gödel’s embedding is often presented as “-prefixing each subformula” (i.e., (·)4
in our notation), although he also introduced some variants in [30]. In McKinsey and
Tarski’s [49], faithfulness was shown for three different embeddings T , T ′, and T ′′; among
them T can be roughly described as (·) with ¬ and ^ as primitives instead of ⊥ and .
The embedding (·)◦ originates from Girard’s embedding of IPC in classical linear logic
[28]. Chagrov and Zakharyashchev presented eight embeddings in [17], with different
primitives and different manners of definition. In [70], the notion of basic embedding first
appears as its unpolarized version, and is then extended to the general case in [71], which
we are following with some notational alternatives.
A natural question is: how general is our “basic” embedding? Our answer follows.
Inevitably, a modal embedding has to be defined with ∧, ∨, and → as primitives, as
they are independent of each other. Being alternatives of each other we have ⊥ and ¬ for
connectives, and  and ^ for modalities. Since BHK semantics is a provability semantics,
it is more natural to have  (provable) instead of ^, though they are no essential technical
differences. Among known embeddings cited above, any embedding defined with ⊥ and
 as primitives is basic, and an embedding defined with ¬ or ^ as a primitive may work
differently (in some cases we may still find the parameters i+, i− so that (¬φ)× ≡ (φ→⊥)×,
while in some other cases, because of the parameters already given to → and ¬, this is
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not possible, like in embeddings T ′ and T ′′ from [49]). It should be emphasized that, in
Section 4.4, we will show the direct self-referentiality of the purely implicational fragment
of IPC. As only implication is involved, it no longer matters whether ⊥ or ¬ is taken as
primitive.
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4.2 A Class of Directly Self-referential S4-formulas
This Section contains materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [71], with the
kind permission from Elsevier, the owner of the copyright of [71]. This Section contains
materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [70], with the kind permission from
Springer, the owner of the copyright of [70].
(Direct) self-referentiality of S4 was first proved by Kuznets in [14] (cf. Theorem 16
in Section 2.1) where the example formula (2.1) was given. In order to show a similar
result on the IPC layer, we adapt Kuznets’ method from [14], and find a natural class of
S4-formulas that require direct self-referentiality in LP.
Recall that we have following notations and conventions. For formulas φ and ψ, by
φ ≡ ψ we mean φ and ψ are syntactically identical. For instance, we may write ¬φ ≡ φ→
⊥, but⊥ . ⊥∧⊥. For terms s, t and formula φ, by sBφ (or sBt), we mean s occurs in φ (or
t, respectively). Let iφ be an abbreviation of  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
φ for any natural number i (note that




be the result of simultaneously substituting p1, ..., pm in φ by ψ1, ..., ψm, respectively.
The following theorem gives a class of S4-formulas that cannot be realized in LP
without calling for a directly self-referential constant specification.
Theorem 88 Assume the following:
(a) All of m, u,w, z, n1, ..., nm are natural numbers, and w, n1, ..., nm > 0.
(b) Both ρ and ζ are propositional formulas with ⊥,∧,∨ as their only connectives.2
All of θ, ξ1, ..., ξm are modal formulas.
2We have chosen ⊥,→ as our primitive connectives for classical propositional formulas. Here by saying
“with ⊥,∧,∨ as their only connectives,” we actually mean ρ and ζ can be presented using these three
(primitive or defined) connectives only. Note that {⊥,∧,∨} is not a complete set of classical propositional
connectives.
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(c) P = {p1, ..., pm} is a set of atoms where each of p1, ..., pm occurs in ρ exactly
once. Each of ξ1, ..., ξm does not have  as its main connective, and does not contain any
occurrence of any atom from P.








zζ) has a counter CS 61-model.
Proof. Since ρ and ζ are propositional formulas, we see that ρr ≡ ρ and ζr ≡ ζ. Thus, any




zζ) has the form














r)→ t4z : · · · : t
4
1 :ζ).
We have the following abbreviations:
I := {1, ...,m} (the set of indexes of elements of P),
S := [
pe











1 :δ, ... , t
1
w : · · · : t
1
1 :δ},
X− := {δ, t11 :δ, ... , t
1







∗1\0 := ∗1 \ ∗0 (this needs not to be an evidence function itself).
Here w > 0 ensures that X , ∅, and hence by the definition of X−, we know that for any
ψ ∈ F :
t :ψ ∈ X for some t ∈ T iff ψ ∈ X−. (4.1)
We also have
δ is a subformula of ψ for any ψ ∈ X ∪ X−. (4.2)
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Let v be a propositional valuation that falsifies all atoms. The desired counter model
isMr = (∗1, v).
For any constant c, axiom A s.t. c : A ∈ CS 61 , we have c : A ∈ CS 61 ∪ X, and hence
A ∈ ∗1(c). SoMr is indeed a CS 61-model.
Observe that it is sufficient to show Mr 2 ρS. To see this, suppose that Mr 2 ρS,
then Mr  δ. By the definition of ∗1 and of X, we have δ ∈ ∗1(t11), t
1
1 : δ ∈ ∗
1(t12), ...,
and t1w−1 : · · · : t
1
1 : δ ∈ ∗
1(t1w). Thus M
r  t1w : · · · : t
1
1 : δ. Since ζ is propositional and has
⊥,∧,∨ as its only connectives, we see by an induction that v(ζ) = 0. So Mr 2 ζ, which
implies Mr 2 t4z : · · · : t
4
1 : ζ. Therefore, M
r 2 t1w : · · · : t
1
1 : δ→ t
4
z : · · · : t
4
1 : ζ, and hence




w : · · · : t
1
1 : δ→ t
4
z : · · · : t
4
1 : ζ). What we construct is actually a counter
CS
61-model.
In order to showMr 2 ρS, we state and prove two claims.
Claim 89 Assume m > 0. Let g ∈ I, and let s be a subterm of tξg1 .
(A) For any φ ∈ F , if φ ∈ ∗0(s), then
(i) LP(CS 61) ` φ,
(ii) tξg1 7 φ;
(B) For any φ ∈ F , if φ ∈ ∗1\0(s), then
(iii) tξ f1 B φ for each f ∈ I,
(iv) φ is not prime, and φ ≡ δ if φ is an implication,










g, ... , t
ξg






Proof. Induction on s, with the IH that (A) and (B) hold for each proper subterm of s.
First observe that if φ ∈ X−, then all of (iii), (iv), (v) hold. To see this, suppose φ ∈ X−.
By (4.2), δ is a subformula of φ. For any f ∈ I, since tξ f1 B δ, we have t
ξ f
1 B φ, (iii) holds.
3In case that ρ is an atom pg ∈ P, we have t
ξg
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There is no prime formula in X− and δ is the only implication in X−, therefore (iv) holds.
To see that (v) holds, suppose that φ ∈ Hg, which implies φ is a proper subformula of δ.
Since δ is a subformula of φ, we have δ as a proper subformula of δ itself, a contradiction.
Therefore, we have:
all of (iii), (iv), (v) follow from φ ∈ X−. (4.3)
(1) s ≡ c for a constant c:
(1A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(c). (1A1) Via initial set. Then c : φ ∈ CS 61 . So φ is an axiom,
hence (i) holds. Suppose that tξg1 B φ, then c B φ since c is a subterm of t
ξg
1 , and hence
CS
61 is directly self-referential, a contradiction. Thus, (ii) holds. (1A2) Via closure.
This is impossible, since closure conditions in Definition 21 put φ into ∗0(c) only if c is a
composite term, which is not the case.
(1B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(c). (1B1) Via initial set. Then c :φ ∈ X (precisely, (CS 61 ∪ X) \
CS
61 , which is a subset of X), which implies φ ∈ X− by (4.1). Now all of (iii), (iv), (v)
hold, by (4.3). (1B2) Via closure. Impossible, since s ≡ c is a constant.
(2) s ≡ x for a constant x:
(2A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(x). (2A1) Via initial set. Then x :φ ∈ CS 61 , which is impossible,
since x is not a constant. (2A2) Via closure. Impossible, since s ≡ x is a variable.
(2B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(x). (2B1) Via initial set. Then x :φ ∈ X, which implies φ ∈ X−
(by (4.1)). From (4.3), all of (iii), (iv), (v) hold. (2B2) Via closure. Impossible, since
s ≡ x is a variable.
(3) s ≡!s1 for a term s1, and by IH both (A) and (B) hold for s1:
(3A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(!s1). (3A1) Via initial set. Then !s1 : φ ∈ CS 61 , which is
impossible since s ≡!s1 is not a constant. (3A2) Via closure. According to Definition 21,
φ ≡ s1 : ψ for some ψ ∈ ∗0(s1). By IH, LP(CS 61) ` ψ. For any CS 61-model M, by
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Theorem 26, M  ψ. Since ψ ∈ ∗0(s1) where ∗0 is the smallest CS 61-evidence function
(by Lemma 22), ψ is also in the image of s1 under the evidence function ofM, and hence
M  s1 :ψ. By Theorem 26, LP(CS 61) ` s1 :ψ, (i) holds. Also by IH, t
ξg
1 7 ψ. Since s1 is
a proper subterm of tξg1 , we know t
ξg
1 7 s1. Hence, t
ξg
1 7 s1 :ψ, (ii) holds.
(3B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(!s1). (3B1) Via initial set. Then !s1 : φ ∈ X, which implies
φ ∈ X− with the help of (4.1). Now (4.3) ensures all of (iii), (iv), and (v). (3B2) Via
closure. Then φ ≡ s1 : ψ for some ψ ∈ ∗1\0(s1). For any f ∈ I, by IH, t
ξ f
1 B ψ, hence
tξ f1 B s1 :ψ, (iii) holds. Since s1 :ψ is neither a prime formula nor an implication, (iv) holds










g, ... , t
ξg




g, ρS}, from which
we can derive that






g, ... , t
ξg









g and s1 :ψ , ρS. The
former holds, since s1 is a proper subterm of t
ξg
1 . For the latter, we reason by subcases.
(3B21) ρ ≡ ⊥ or ρ ≡ p for some atom p < P. By assumption (c) of Theorem 88, P = ∅.
Hence m = 0, which violates the assumption of this claim. (3B22) ρ ≡ p for some atom
p ∈ P, then by assumptions of Theorem 88, ρ ≡ p ≡ p1, P = {p1}, m = 1, and I = {1}.
Thus we have g = 1, and hence
ρS ≡ p1[
pe












while we have verified s1 : ψ , t
ξ1




1 at (4.4). (3B23), if none of the first two
subcases hold, then by assumption (b) of Theorem 88, ρ has main connective ∧ or ∨, so
is ρS. Therefore, s1 :ψ , ρS. In summary, s1 :ψ , ρS in all subcases, (v) holds.
(4) s ≡ s1 · s2 for some terms s1 and s2, while by IH (A) and (B) hold for both s1 and
s2:
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(4A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(s1 · s2). (4A1) Via initial set. Then (s1 · s2) : φ ∈ CS 61 , which is
impossible since s ≡ s1 · s2 is not a constant. (4A2) Via closure. Then there is some τ s.t.
τ→φ ∈ ∗0(s1) and τ ∈ ∗0(s2). By IH, we have LP(CS 61) ` τ→φ and LP(CS 61) ` τ, then
LP(CS 61) ` φ, (i) holds. By IH, tξg1 7 τ→φ, which implies t
ξg
1 7 φ, (ii) holds.
(4B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1 · s2). (4B1) Via initial set. Then s1 · s2 :φ ∈ X, which implies
φ ∈ X− with the help of (4.1). All of (iii), (iv), (v) are ensured by (4.3). (4B2) Via closure.
So there is a formula τ s.r. τ→ φ ∈ ∗1(s1) and τ ∈ ∗1(s2). There are four subcases, but
none of them are possible. (4B21) τ→ φ ∈ ∗0(s1) and τ ∈ ∗0(s2). Then φ ∈ ∗0(s1 · s2) by
Definition 21, a contradiction. (4B22) τ→φ ∈ ∗0(s1) and τ ∈ ∗1\0(s2). By IH, t
ξg
1 7 τ→φ.
But also by IH, tξg1 B τ, hence t
ξg
1 B τ→ φ, a contradiction. (4B23) τ→ φ ∈ ∗
1\0(s1) and
τ ∈ ∗0(s2). By IH, t
ξg
1 7 τ. Since τ→ φ is an implication, by IH, τ→ φ ≡ δ, so τ ≡ ρS.
Note that tξg1 B ρS; we have a contradiction. (4B24) τ→ φ ∈ ∗
1\0(s1) and τ ∈ ∗1\0(s2).
By IH, we know that τ < Hg. As in subcase (b.3), by applying IH on τ→ φ, we have
τ ≡ ρS ∈ Hg, a contradiction. In summary, (4B2) is impossible.
(5) s ≡ s1+s2 for some terms s1 and s2, while by IH (A) and (B) hold for both s1 and
s2:
(5A) Assume φ ∈ ∗0(s1+s2). (5A1) Via initial set. Then (s1+s2) :φ ∈ CS 61 , which is
impossible since s ≡ s1+s2 is not a constant. (5A2) Via closure. Then w.l.o.g., φ ∈ ∗0(s1),
and hence both (i) and (ii) follow from IH.
(5B) Assume φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1+s2). (5B1) Via initial set. Then s1+s2 :φ ∈ X, which implies
φ ∈ X−. From (4.3), we have all of (iii), (iv), (v). (5B2) Via closure. Then φ < ∗0(s1),
φ < ∗0(s2), and w.l.o.g., φ ∈ ∗1(s1). Thus φ ∈ ∗1\0(s1), which, by IH, gives all of (iii), (iv),
and (v). a
Claim 90 Assume m > 0. For any f ∈ I, ifMr  p fS, then S4 ` n f ξ f .
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Proof. Since Mr  p fS, we have Mr  t
ξ f




f , which implies ξ
r
f ∈ ∗
1(tξ f1 ). Here
the existence of term tξ f1 is ensured by n f > 0 from assumption (a) of Theorem 88.
Assume with the seek of a contradiction that ξrf ∈ ∗
1\0(tξ f1 ). Then ξ
r
f cannot be a prime
formula, as stated in Claim 89(B)(iv). Again by Claim 89(B)(iv), ξrf is not an implication,
since otherwise we have ξrf ≡ δ while δ ≡ ρS → θ
r has ξrf as a proper subformula,
a contradiction. Also, ξrf cannot have the form of t : ψ, since ξ f has main connective
other than  by assumption (c) of Theorem 88. In summary, ξrf cannot be any formula, a
contradiction. Thus the assumption is false, which implies ξrf ∈ ∗
0(tξ f1 ).
By Claim 89(A)(i), we have LP(CS 61) ` ξrf . By Theorem 8, we see that S4 ` ξ f , and
then S4 ` n f ξ f . a
We are now ready to showMr 2 ρS.
If m = 0, then ρ has no atoms from P, which implies ρS ≡ ρ. Hence ρS ≡ ρ consists
of only ⊥, ∧, ∨ as connectives, and positive atoms that are falsified by v. By induction,
we see thatMr 2 ρS.
If m > 0, define the propositional valuation vMr as follows:
vMr (p) =

0 if p < P ;
0 if p ≡ p f ∈ P andMr 2 t
ξ f





1 if p ≡ p f ∈ P andMr  t
ξ f





For any atom p, since v(p) = 0, we haveMr 2 p. Note that
pS ≡
{
p if p < P




f if p ≡ p f ∈ P
,
and hence for any atom p, we have vMr (p) = 1 iffMr  pS. An induction on subformulas
of ρ shows that vMr (ρ) = 1 iffMr  ρS. Since ρ is a propositional formula with all
connectives belonging to {⊥,∧,∨}, all its subformulas are positive, and for any subformula
ψ, vMr (ψ) = 1 implies that
∧
{p | vMr (p) = 1}→ψ is a tautology.4
4By the definition of vMr , we see that vMr (p) = 1 only if p belongs to the finite set P. Therefore, we
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With the seek of a contradiction, assumeMr  ρS. Then vMr (ρ) = 1, and hence
∧
{p | vMr (p) = 1}→ρ
is a tautology. Since vMr (p) = 0 for any p < P, we have
{p | vMr (p) = 1} = {p f | f ∈ I, vMr (p f ) = 1}.
Thus
∧





]me=1 | f ∈ I,M








{n f ξ f | f ∈ I,Mr  p fS}→ ρ[
pe
neξe
]me=1. By Claim 90, for any f ∈ I,
if Mr  p fS, then S4 ` n f ξ f . Thus S4 ` ρ[
pe
neξe
]me=1, which contradicts with assump-
tion (d) of this theorem.
In summary, we have provedMr 2 ρS in both cases. a
Some interesting special cases of Theorem 88 are gathered in the following corollary.
Corollary 91 Let σ be a modal formula s.t. S4 0 σ.
(A) Let ζ be a propositional formula with ⊥,∧,∨ as its only connectives and let θ be
a modal formula, then any realization of
u(w(xσ→θ)→zζ) (w, x > 0)
has a counter CS 61-model.
(B) If S4 ` ^σ and (w, x > 0), then
u(w(xσ→y⊥)→z⊥) ∈ S4 \ S461 .
(C) If S4 ` ^σ, then ^σ < S461 .
are not using infinite conjunction, and
∧
{p | vMr (p) = 1} can be seen as an abbreviation of a finite formula.
By the same reason, all conjunctions applied to sets in this proof are abbreviations of finite formulas. Also,∧
∅ ≡ > by standard definition.
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Proof. (A) As a modal formula, σ has the form of x′σ0 for some natural number x′,
where σ0 has main connective other than . Take a fresh (propositional) atom p1. Let






As assumed in Theorem 88: w > 0 is given; n1 = x + x′ > 0 since x > 0; ζ is propositional
and has only ⊥,∧,∨ as its connectives; θ is a modal formula; so is ξ1 ≡ σ0 which further






] ≡ xσ since S4 0 σ.
Thus the desired counter CS 61-model is offered by Theorem 88.
(B) Since S4 ` ^σ ≡ (σ→⊥)→⊥, S4 ` (σ→y⊥)→z⊥. Since w, x > 0,
we further have S4 ` w(xσ→y⊥)→z⊥, and thus S4 ` u(w(xσ→y⊥)→z⊥).
Let θ ≡ y⊥ and ζ ≡ ⊥, by (A), there is a counter CS 61-model Mr for any possible
realization of u(w(xσ→y⊥)→z⊥).
Suppose we were able to realize u(w(xσ→ y⊥)→ z⊥) (denote the realization
temporarily by κ) with a constant specification CS′ that is not directly self-referential.
That is, we have LP(CS′) ` κ. By Definition 15, for any c : A ∈ CS′, c 7 A. That is
to say, CS′ ⊆ CS 61 and hence the proof is also an LP(CS 61)-proof. By Theorem 26,
M  κ for any CS 61-model M, which contradicts the existence of the counter CS 61-
model Mr. Therefore, any realization of u(w(xσ→ y⊥)→ z⊥) calls for a directly
self-referential constant specification.
(C) A trivial case of (B) where w = x = 1 and u = y = z = 0. a
Corollary 91 gives a natural class of self-referential S4-theorems that are interesting
by their own. Modal theorems in T, K4, and D4 that require direct self-referentiality (w.r.t.
realizations in justification logics JT, J4, and JD4, respectively) are given in [45] [46],
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where T and D4 share the same instance with S4 (i.e., formula (2.1) in Theorem 16), and
the instance in K4 is ¬⊥→¬¬(p→p), which is also a T-theorem. Note that S4 0 σ
implies T 0 ^σ, and hence Corollary 91(C) gives a natural class of self-referential modal
instances that are not T-theorems. For example, the S4-theorem ^(^p→p), which
is not provable in T, is not a member of S461 (cf. Figure 3.2 in Section 3.3).
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4.3 A Class of Directly Self-referential IPC-theorems
This Section contains materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [71], with the
kind permission from Elsevier, the owner of the copyright of [71]. This Section contains
materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [70], with the kind permission from
Springer, the owner of the copyright of [70].
Self-referentiality in IPC is defined as follows:
Definition 92 (Self-referentiality of IPC-theorems) An IPC-theorem φ is said to be self-
referential (directly self-referential), if for each (faithful) basic embedding (·)×, the image
φ× is self-referential in S4. a
In this section we show the following theorem.
Theorem 93 (Direct Self-referentiality of IPC) If α is a tautology such that IPC 0 α,
then ¬¬α is a directly self-referential IPC-theorem.
Proof. Glivenko’s Theorem (cf. [60]) ensures IPC ` ¬¬α.
Take any basic embedding (·)×. By Example 86,
(¬¬α)× ≡  j+( j−+k+(k−α×→i−+l−⊥)→i++l+⊥).
Since CPC ` α, we see that α is not a prime formula, and hence α ≡ α1  α2 where
 ∈ {∧,∨,→}. Note that α is a positive subformula of ¬¬α, so we have:
α× ≡ (α1  α2)× ≡  j+(k+α×1±  
l+α×2 ),
where α×1± is α
×
1+ if · ∈ {∧,∨}, and is α
×
1− if · ∈ {→}. Abbreviate 
k+α×1± 
l+α×2 by σ, we
have α× ≡  j+σ, and hence
(¬¬α)× ≡  j+( j−+k+( j++k−σ→i−+l−⊥)→i++l+⊥).
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Since IPC 0 α, we know that S4 0 α× ≡  j+σ, which implies
S4 0 σ. (4.5)
Case 1, j+ +k− > 0. Let u = j+, w = j−+k+, x = j+ +k−, z = i+ + l+, θ ≡ i−+l−⊥, and
ζ ≡ ⊥. Note that from Lemma 87(B) we know that j− + k+ > 0 and hence w > 0. Also,
j+ + k− > 0 is given and hence x > 0. By Corollary 91(A), there is a counter CS 6-model
for any realization of
(¬¬α)× ≡  j+( j−+k+( j++k−σ→i−+l−⊥)→i++l+⊥).
Case 2, j+ = k− = 0. We have α× ≡ σ and
(¬¬α)× ≡  j+( j−+k+(σ→i−+l−⊥)→i++l+⊥).
Since k− = 0, by Lemma 87(C), j+ > 0. So j+ , j+, and hence  ∈ {∧,∨}. We have a
claim here.
Claim 94 Let φ be a positive subformula of α (also that of ¬¬α), and let ψ by a negative
subformula of φ. Then there is an implication η as a positive subformula of φ s.t. ψ is a
subformula of η.
Proof. Let ψ′ be the maximal negative subformula of φ that has ψ as a subformula.
Note that ψ′ can be neither a conjunct (disjunct) of a conjunction (disjunction) nor the
succedent of an implication, since otherwise ψ′ is a proper subformula of another negative
subformula of φ that has ψ as a subformula. So ψ′ can only be the antecedent of a positive
implication, denoted by η. Since ψ′ is a negative subformula of φ, we see that ψ′ is a
proper subformula of φ. Having ψ′ as its antecedent, η is a subformula of φ. a
Let d be a negative atom, ∧, ∨, or → in σ ≡ α×. The source of d is in the scope of
a negative subformula ψ of α. By Claim 94, there is an implication η that is a positive
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subformula of α and has ψ as a subformula. Since j+ > 0, we know that η× is a -prefixed
formula. Therefore, ψ×− is in the scope of a , and so is d. As an intuitionistic propositional
formula, α may have atoms and connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨, and→. By the observation above,
each negative one is in the scope of a . Since j+ > 0, each positive → is in the scope
of a . As a result, α× ≡ σ is a ⊥,∧,∨-combination of positive atoms and -prefixed
formulas. Let ι1, ..., ιm be the list of all maximal -prefixed subformulas of σ where m
is the total number of these subformulas. (Syntactically identical subformulas, like all
p’s in p ∧ p ∧ p, are distinguished here, and are all put into the list.) For each
e ∈ {1, ...,m}, let ξe be the maximal non--prefixed subformula of ιe, and hence we have
ιe ≡ 
neξe for a positive natural number ne. Let p1, ..., pm be m fresh pairwise distinct
(propositional) atoms, and let ρ be the result of simultaneously replacing ι1, ..., ιm in σ by
p1, ..., pm respectively. As a result, ρ is a ⊥,∧,∨-combination of atoms, and each atom
from {p1, ..., pm} occurs in ρ exactly once. Since all of p1, ..., pm are fresh, they do not





and then S4 0 ρ[
pe
neξe
]me=1 by (4.5). Let u = j+, w = j− + k+, z = i+ + l+, θ ≡ 
i−+l−⊥,
and ζ ≡ ⊥. Note that from Lemma 87(B) we know that j− + k+ > 0 and hence w > 0. By
Theorem 88, there is a counter CS 6-model for any realization of





In summary, we have a counter CS 6-model for any realization of (¬¬α)× in ei-
ther case. By Theorem 26, any possible realization of (¬¬α)× calls for a directly self-
referential constant specification. a
The set of IPC-theorems shown to require direct self-referentiality in Theorem 93 can
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be briefly displayed as
¬¬(CPC \ IPC).
An observation on the Rieger–Nishimura Lattice lists out many instances in this set.
Definition 95 (Rieger–Nishimura Lattice [10]) For any atom p, let
f0(p) := ⊥,
f1(p) := p,
fn+2(p) := gn(p) ∨ gn+1(p);

g0(p) := p,
g1(p) := ¬p ≡ p→⊥,
gn+2(p) := gn+1(p)→ fn(p).
a
Corollary 96 Let p be an atom. If
β ∈ B(p) := { fn(p) | n > 1} ∪ {gn(p) | n > 2} ,
then ¬¬β is a directly self-referential IPC-theorem.
Proof. Observe that any formula in B(p) is a tautology, but not an IPC-theorem. Then use
Theorem 93. a
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4.4 Direct Self-referentiality in the Purely Implicational
Fragment of IPC
This Section contains materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [71], with the
kind permission from Elsevier, the owner of the copyright of [71]. This Section contains
materials reused from the candidate’s published paper [70], with the kind permission from
Springer, the owner of the copyright of [70].
Recall that in the language of intuitionistic propositional logic, all of ⊥,∧,∨,→ are
primitives. Restricting the language to have→ as the only primitive in Definition 9, and
deleting all axiom schemes that contains ⊥, ∧, or ∨, we get the purely implicational
fragment of IPC, denoted by IPC→.
IPC is a conservative extension of IPC→, as presented in the following fact.
Fact 97 ([63]) Let φ be a propositional formula that consists of only propositional atoms
and→. If IPC ` φ, then IPC→ ` φ.
In Theorem 93 we have found a class of directly self-referential IPC-theorems, i.e.,
¬¬(IPC \ IPC).
Since ¬ is defined on ⊥ and →, all examples we have so far involve ⊥. In this section,
we give a directly self-referential theorem in IPC→5 which is a moderation of the Peirce’s
law.
Theorem 98 (Direct Self-referentiality of IPC→) The IPC-theorem
((((p→q)→ p)→ p)→q)→q
is directly self-referential.
5The question whether there is a self-referential example in IPC→ was raised by Melvin Fitting.
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Proof. Take any basic embedding (·)×. Let χ ≡ ((p→q)→ p)→ p, then γ ≡ ((((p→q)→
p)→ p)→q)→q can be abbreviated as (χ→q)→q. By calculation,
χ× ≡ (((p→q)→ p)→ p)× ≡  j+(k+((p→q)→ p)×−→
l+ p×)
since χ is a positive subformula of γ.
Let σ ≡ k+((p→q)→ p)×−→
l+ p×, we have χ× ≡  j+σ, and hence by Example 86,
γ× ≡ ((χ→q)→q)× ≡  j+( j−+k+( j++k−σ→h−+l−q)→h++l+q). (4.6)
Since IPC 0 χ, S4 0 χ× ≡  j+σ, and hence S4 0 σ. Note that q is a propositional
formula with no connectives. Let u = j+, w = j− + k+, x = j+ + k−, z = h+ + l+,
θ ≡ h−+l−q, and ζ ≡ q. Note that from Lemma 87(B) we know that j− + k+ > 0 and
hence w > 0. Also, from Lemma 87(C) we know that j+ + k− > 0 and hence x > 0. By
Corollary 91(A), any realization of  j+( j−+k+( j++k−σ→h−+l−q)→h++l+q) has a counter
CS
6-model. By (4.6), any realization of γ× has a counter CS 61-model. By Theorem 26,
any realization of γ× calls for a directly self-referential constant specification. a
Theorem 98 indicates that the BHK semantics of intuitionistic implication involves
direct self-referentiality.
At the end of Section 4.1, we have discussed the generality of the basic embedding.
Once ⊥ and  are chosen as primitives, the class of basic embeddings is then natural and
general. This section takes care of the purely implicational fragment, and hence pushes
our result in to a border sense where ⊥ is not necessarily primitive.
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4.5 Fragments of IPC
In Chapter 3, we show that both X⊗, X6 and X61 are not closed under MP for each X ∈
{T,K4,S4}. Given a basic embedding (·)× as a parameter, we can define similar fragments
of IPC based on that of S4. In this section, after giving definitions of fragments, we will
restrict ourselves to the IPC→, show that each axiom there, via any given basic embedding,
is loop-free provable in S4, hence non-self-referential realizable in LP. Combined with
our results in Section 4.4, we will see that none of these fragments of IPC→ are closed
under MP. Similar results for IPC will then follow from conservativity .
We start with definitions of fragments.
Definition 99 (Loop-free Provable Fragment of IPC and IPC→) Let (·)× be a basic
embedding.
(1) The loop-free provable fragment of IPC via (·)×, denoted by IPC⊗(×), is defined as
IPC⊗(×) := {IPC ` φ | φ× ∈ S4⊗}.
(2) The loop-free provable fragment of IPC→ via (·)× is defined as
IPC⊗(×)→ := {IPC→ ` φ | φ
× ∈ S4⊗}.
a
Definition 100 (Non-self-referential Fragment of IPC and IPC→) Let (·)× be a basic
embedding.
(1) The non-self-referential fragment of IPC via (·)×, denoted by IPC6(×), is defined as
IPC 6(×) := {IPC ` φ | φ× ∈ S46}.
(2) The non-self-referential fragment of IPC→ via (·)× is defined as
IPC 6(×)→ := {IPC→ ` φ | φ
× ∈ S46}.
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(3) Similar definitions for the non-directly-self-referential fragments, for which we
take 61 instead of 6 for notations. a
The following theorem is quite obvious.
Theorem 101 If (·)× is a basic embedding, then:
(A) IPC⊗(×) ⊆ IPC 6(×) ⊆ IPC 61(×);





Proof. (A) Assume φ ∈ IPC⊗(×). Then φ× ∈ S4⊗. By Corollary 71, S4⊗ ⊆ S46, hence
φ× ∈ S46 which implies φ ∈ IPC 6(×).
Assume φ ∈ IPC 6(×). Then φ× ∈ S46. By Theorem 70, S46 ⊆ S461 , hence φ× ∈ S461
which implies φ ∈ IPC 61(×).
(B) Similar to (A). a
In our current notation, Theorem 98 can be reformulated as follows:
Corollary 102 Denote the IPC-theorem ((((p→ q)→ p)→ p)→ q)→ q by γ. For any
basic embedding (·)×:
(A) (i) γ < IPC61(×)→ , (ii) γ < IPC
6(×)
→ , and (iii) γ < IPC
⊗(×)
→ ;
(B) (i) γ < IPC61(×), (ii)γ < IPC 6(×), and (iii) γ < IPC⊗(×).
Proof. (A) (i) directly follows from Theorem 98, then (ii) and (iii) follow from Theorem
101(B).
(B) (i) Suppose with the seek of a contradiction that γ ∈ IPC 61(×). By Definition 100,
IPC ` γ and γ× ∈ S461 . Since γ has→as its only connective, by Fact 97, IPC→ ` γ, and
hence γ ∈ IPC 61(×)→ , which contradicts (A)(i).
By Theorem 101(A), we further have (ii) and (iii). a
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We now concentrate our attention to IPC→, and show that all axioms of it are included
in IPC⊗(×)→ , for any unpolarized basic embedding (·)
×.
Theorem 103 For any IPC→-formulas φ, ψ, χ and unpolarized basic embedding (·)×:
(A) (φ→ (ψ→φ) ∈ IPC⊗(×)→ ;
(B) (φ→ (ψ→χ))→ ((φ→ψ)→ (φ→χ)) ∈ IPC⊗(×)→ .
Proof. Fact 56 in Section 3.1 will be used many times throughout the proof in order to
show that certain applications of rules will not introduce a prehistoric loop. To avoid
repetition, we assume that the reader will keep Fact 56 in mind, and refer to it once he is
not sure about certain rules.
(A) It is sufficient to show that G3s⊗ `⇒ (φ→ (ψ→φ))×.
By calculation,
(φ→ (ψ→φ))× ≡  j(kφ×→ j+l(kψ×→lφ×)).
If we have G3s⊗ ` kφ× ⇒  j+l(kψ×→lφ×), then what follows is the desired loop-free
proof:
kφ× ⇒  j+l(kψ×→lφ×) assumed to be loop-free
⇒ kφ×→ j+l(kψ×→lφ×) (R→)
⇒  j(kφ×→ j+l(kψ×→lφ×)) (
−→
R).
Thus, it is sufficient to show G3s⊗ ` kφ× ⇒  j+l(kψ×→lφ×).
(1) If k > 0, we can take the following:
φ× ⇒ φ× loop-free by Lemma 57
kφ× ⇒ φ× (
−−−→
LW)
kψ×,kφ× ⇒ lφ× (
−→
R)
kφ× ⇒ kψ×→lφ× (R→)
kφ× ⇒  j+l(kψ×→lφ×) (
−→
R),
where (R) is applicable since k > 0.
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(2) Otherwise, k = 0, and hence k+ = 0. By Lemma 87, h− > 0 and j− > 0, which
implies h > 0 and j > 0 in unpolarized case.
Now, for an atom p, we have p× ≡ h p being -prefixed. Also, for any formulas α
and β, we have (α→ β)× ≡  j(kα×→lβ×) being -prefixed. This forms an induction
showing that θ× is -prefixed for any θ.
Recall that it is sufficient to show G3s⊗ ` kφ× ⇒  j+l(kψ× → lφ×), which is
G3s⊗ ` φ× ⇒  j+l(ψ×→lφ×) since k = 0. The following loop-proof works:
φ× ⇒ φ× loop-free by Lemma 57
ψ×, φ× ⇒ lφ× (
−→
R)
φ× ⇒ ψ×→lφ× (R→)
φ× ⇒  j+l(ψ×→lφ×) (
−→
R),
where (R) is applicable since φ× is -prefixed.
(B) It is sufficient to show that G3s⊗ `⇒ ((φ→ (ψ→χ))→ ((φ→ψ)→ (φ→χ)))×. By
calculation,
((φ→ (ψ→χ))→ ((φ→ψ)→ (φ→χ)))× ≡
 j( j+k(kφ×→ j+l(kψ×→lχ×))→ j+l( j+k(kφ×→lψ×)→ j+l(kφ×→lχ×))).
Taking fresh propositional atoms p, q, and r, we construct a loop-free proof in the
following steps.
Step 1. Both
〈k p〉, q ⇒ q (Ax)




k p ⇒ k p, 〈q〉 loop-free by Lemma 57
are loop-free. Continuing on these two conclusions by
〈k p〉,lq⇒ q k p⇒ k p, 〈q〉
k p→lq,k p⇒ q
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we have a proof that is also loop-free, since for (L→), among each pair of unified formu-
las, there is one being isolated.
Step 2. Case (1) If k > 0, then we continue our construction as follows:
 j+k(k p→lq),k p ⇒ q as in Step 1
 j+k(k p→lq),k p ⇒ kq, 〈r〉 (
−→
R),
where (R) is applicable since k > 0 by assumption. Case (2) Otherwise, k = 0. In this
case, kq ≡ q, and hence what we have constructed by Step 1 is a loop-free proof of
 j+k(k p→lq),k p⇒ kq. We continue by
 j+k(k p→lq),k p ⇒ kq as in Step 1
 j+k(k p→lq),k p ⇒ kq, 〈r〉 (W),
which is loop-free. In both Case (1) and Case (2), we see that
G3s⊗ `  j+k(k p→lq),k p⇒ kq, 〈r〉.
Step 3. Observe that
〈 j+k(k p→lq)〉, 〈k p〉, r ⇒ r (Ax)
is loop-free, and we can combine it with what we have by Step 2 like follows:
〈 j+k(k p→lq)〉, 〈k p〉, r ⇒ r  j+k(k p→lq),k p⇒ kq, 〈r〉
kq→r, j+k(k p→lq),k p⇒ r





Since among each pair of unified formulas, there is one being isolated, (L→) does not
introduce a loop here. Thus,
G3s⊗ `  j+l(kq→r), j+k(k p→lq),k p⇒ r.
Step 4. Observe that
〈 j+k(k p→lq)〉,k p ⇒ k p, 〈r〉 loop-free by Lemma 57
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is loop-free. Combining it with what we constructed by Step 3, we have
 j+l(kq→r), j+k(k p→lq),k p⇒ r 〈 j+k(k p→lq)〉,k p⇒ k p, 〈r〉
k p→ j+l(kq→r), j+k(k p→lq),k p⇒ r
(L→)
which is loop-free. Note that other than reasons mentioned above, there is a pair of non-
isolated k p’s from antecedents being unified. Since k p’s in antecedents contain no
positive ’s, there are no vertices from these formulas in prehistoric graphs. Therefore,
this unification cannot make a loop.
Step 5. Continue the construction like follows:
k p→ j+l(kq→r), j+k(k p→lq),k p ⇒ r as in Step 4
 j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r)), j+k(k p→lq),k p ⇒ r (
−−−→
LW)
 j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r)), j+k(k p→lq) ⇒ k p→r (R→)
 j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r)), j+k(k p→lq) ⇒  j+l(k p→r) (
−→
R)
 j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r)) ⇒  j+k(k p→lq)→ j+l(k p→r) (R→)
 j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r)) ⇒  j+l( j+k(k p→lq)→ j+l(k p→r)) (
−→
R)
⇒  j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r))→ j+l( j+k(k p→lq)→ j+l(k p→r)) (R→)
⇒  j( j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r))→ j+l( j+k(k p→lq)→ j+l(k p→r))) (
−→
R)
where (R) is applicable since j + k > 0 (by Lemma 87). This gives us
G3s⊗ `  j( j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r))→ j+l( j+k(k p→lq)→ j+l(k p→r))).





 j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r))→
 j+l( j+k(k p→lq)→ j+l(k p→r))
))
[p/φ×][q/ψ×][r/lχ×].
We are done since(
 j
(
 j+k(k p→ j+l(kq→r))→
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Corollary 104 For any IPC→-formulas φ, ψ, χ and unpolarized basic embedding (·)×:
(A) φ→ (ψ→φ) ∈ IPC6(×)→ ;
(B) (φ→ (ψ→χ))→ ((φ→ψ)→ (φ→χ)) ∈ IPC 6(×)→ .
(C) φ→ (ψ→φ) ∈ IPC 61(×)→ ;
(D) (φ→ (ψ→χ))→ ((φ→ψ)→ (φ→χ)) ∈ IPC 61(×)→ .




→ . Hence (A) and (C) follow
from Theorem 103(A), while (B) and (D) follow from Theorem 103(B). a
Now we are ready to present our last theorem in this thesis.
Theorem 105 (Non-admissibility of MP) For any unpolarized basic embedding (·)×:
(A) Each of IPC⊗(×)→ , IPC
6(×)
→ , and IPC
61(×)
→ is not closed under MP;
(B) Each of IPC⊗(×), IPC6(×), and IPC 61(×) is not closed under MP.
Proof. (A) By Theorem 103 and Corollary 104, we see that all axioms of IPC→ are
included in each of these three fragments. If any of the three fragments is closed under
MP, then that fragment will include all IPC→-theorems, which contradicts with Corollary
102(A).
(B) We prove for IPC 61(×), and the proof for the other two is quite similar.
Denote ((((p→q)→ p)→ p)→q)→q by γ.
By Theorem 103 and Corollary 104, we see that each axiom of IPC→ is included in
IPC61(×)→ . By Definition 100, we see that IPC
61(×)
→ ⊆ IPC
61(×) and hence each axiom of
IPC→ is included in IPC 61(×). If IPC61(×) were closed under MP, then it would contain
any theorem in IPC→, including γ, which contradicts Corollary 102(B). a
Recall that in Section 3.2 we show that non-self-referential fragments of modal logics
T, K4, and S4 are not closed under MP. In this section we get similar results for IPC
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and IPC→. All these indicates the complexity of self-referentiality, which is explicitly
displayed in justification logic, but very hard to be captured in more implicit layers.
Chapter 5
Suggested Future Works
There are many interesting open questions related to this thesis. We list some of them in
the order from conceptional to technical.
In Chapter 4, we show that the BHK semantics of intuitionistic logic (specifically,
of intuitionistic implication) is intrinsically self-referential. Recall that the BHK stipu-
lation for implication says “a proof of φ → ψ is a construction that returns a proof of
ψ whenever a proof of φ is given.” This stipulation has the notion of “any” applied to
the class of “proofs” that is being defined by the stipulation itself. Therefore, this stip-
ulation is impredicative. As suggested by Artemov and Kurokawa during a discussion,
self-referentiality is likely the cost we pay for the impredicativity of BHK in this frame-
work.
The notion of prehistoric graph presented in Chapter 2 was employed as a tool in
the research of self-referentiality. However, this notion is interesting by its own, since it
naturally capture dependence relation between modalities in a sequent proof tree. It will
not be surprising if this idea is used in researches about substructural logic or theorem
proving.
The notion of basic embedding presented in Chapter 4 receives relatively fewer at-
tention in this thesis. We gave several necessary conditions on parameters for an basic
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embedding to be faithful in terms of mapping IPC into S4. Some sub/super-intuitionistic
logics can also be embedded into modal logics, usually by Gödel’s “-prefixing each sub-
formula” embedding, instanced by [64] and [17]. There are also similar works on the
substructural perspective like [19]. It is interesting to explorer the power of basic embed-
ding in those pairs of logics, and even in the proof of faithfulness.
In [64], Visser established the basic propositional logic, and gave there an embedding
(which is basic in our terminology) that maps it faithfully into K4. As verified by Kuznets,
K4 has self-referential theorems, we can ask the question that whether self-referentiality
is intrinsic in Visser’s logic.
Since Kuznets [14], which gave the first example in S4 that requires self-referentiality,
a criterion for self-referentiality has been desired. Now more self-referential theorems in
S4 have been found but a criterion is still not known, and there is no answer for basic
questions like whether self-referentiality is decidable in modal logic or not. We have seen
in Chapter 2 that prehistoric-loop-free provability implies non-self-referential realizabil-
ity. This is only an one-direction result and hence does not offer a complete criterion. So
far, all self-referential and non-self-referential modal theorems found coincide with the
conjecture that the other direction also holds.
Related to the question above, another basic question that is still open is, whether or
not there is a modal theorem that is self-referential, but not directly self-referential. Our
best approximation so far of non-direct-self-referentiality is still bounded by non-self-
referentiality, whereas all self-referential instances we have are directly self-referential.
Taking the possible difference between self-referentiality and direct-self-referentiality
into account, figures like those at the end of Section 3.3 may look more complex, and may
need more instances to be completed.
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The family of justification logics has many members and is still growing. While all
of our attentions are paid to modal/justification logics smaller than or equal to S4/LP,
there are also many instances larger than this pair, some have other operators in terms,
and/or need different methods to establish meta-theorems like realization. Since Kuznets’
first self-referential instance for S4, it has long been assumed that some “thing” in S4 is
the cause for that, and any logic larger than S4 is automatically self-referential, as they
also have that “thing.” This is perhaps the reason why most attentions, including that of
the candidate’s, have been drawn to logics smaller than S4. However, as we verified in
Section 3.3, a modal formula can be self-referential in one logic while being non-self-
referential in a larger logic. It is therefore quite reasonable to turn back, checking whether
our self-referential instances for S4 also work for larger logics.
Bibliography
[1] Sergei N. Artemov: Operational modal logic. Technical Report MSI 95-29. Cornell
University (1995)
[2] Sergei N. Artemov: Explicit provability and constructive semantics. The Bulletin of
Symbolic Logic 7(1), 1-36 (2001)
[3] Sergei N. Artemov: Symmetric logic of proofs. In: Arnon Avron, et al. (eds.):
Trakhtenbrot/Festschrift. LNCS 4800, 58-71. Springer (2008)
[4] Sergei N. Artemov: The logic of justification. The Review of Symbolic Logic 1(4),
477-513 (2008)
[5] Sergei N. Artemov: The ontology of justifications in the logical setting. Technical
Report 2011008, Ph.D. Program in Computer Science, the City University of New
York (2011)
[6] Sergei N. Artemov, Lev D. Beklemishev: Provability logic. In: Dov M. Gabbay,
Franz Guenthner (eds.): Handbook of Philosophical Logic v.10. Kluwer Academic
Publisher (2002)
[7] Sergei N. Artemov, Tyko Straβen: The logic of the Gödel proof predicate. In:
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[58] Craig Smoryński: Self-reference and modal logic. Springer (1985)
[59] Raymond M. Smullyan: Diagonalization and Self-Reference. Oxford Logic Guides
27. Oxford Science (1994)
[60] Morten Heine Sørensen, Pawel Urzyczyn: Lectures on the Curry-Howard Isomor-
phism. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2006)
[61] Yasuhito Suzuki, Hiroakira Ono: Hilbert style proof system for BPL. Research Re-
port IS-RR-97-0040F, JAIST (1993)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
[62] Anne Sjerp Troelstra, Dirk van Dalen: Constructivism in Mathematics, an Introduc-
tion. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1988)
[63] Anne Sjerp Troelstra, Helmut Schwichtenberg: Basic Proof Theory, 2nd ed. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge (2000)
[64] Albert Visser: A propositional logic with explicit fixed points. Studia Logica 40,
155-175 (1981)
[65] Wang, Ren-June: On non-circular proofs and proof realization in modal logic. Tech-
nical Report TR-2011012, CUNY PhD Program in Computer Science (2011)
[66] Noson S. Yanofsky: A universal approach to self-referential paradixes, imcomplete-
ness and fixed points. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9(3), 362-386 (2003)
[67] Noson S. Yanofsky: The Outer Limits of Reason: What Science, Mathematics, and
Logic Cannot Tell Us. The MIT Press (2013)
[68] Yu, Junhua: Prehistoric phenomena and self-referentiality. In: Farid Ablayev, Ernst
W. Mayr (eds.): CSR 2010. LNCS 6072, 384-396. Springer (2010)
[69] Yu, Junhua: On Self-referentiality in Realization: Possible Criteria via Gentzen Cal-
culus (in Chinese). Master Thesis. Tsinghua University (2010)
[70] Yu, Junhua: Self-referentiality in the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics of
intuitionistic logic. In: Sergei N. Artemov, Anil Nerode (eds.): LFCS 2013. LNCS
7734, 401-414. Springer (2013)
[71] Yu, Junhua: Self-referentiality of Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics. Annals
of Pure and Applied Logic 165(1), 371-388 (2014)
[72] Yu, Junhua: Prehistoric graph in modal derivations and self-referentiality. Theory of
Computing Systems 54(2), 190-210 (2014)
[73] Yu, Junhua: Closure properties of non-self-referential fragments of modal and intu-
itionistic logics. Manuscript (2014)
